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Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
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BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A., STEWART TITLE 
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Defendants/Respondents. 
JNO. 20b74 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action arises out of the construction of a two million oollar builaing 
in Ogaen, Utah to house a manufacturing process. The Arizona developer, u oc A 
Development and C & A Enterprises (hereinalter "C & A"), failed to pay the Utah 
general contractor, Worthington & Kimball, the balance due on the construction contract 
of approximately $400,000.00. Pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the construction 
contract, the parties arbitrated tne claims of Worthington & Kimball ana the developer's 
counterclaim ot over one million dollars. Ihe panel of arbitrators awarded Worthington 
& Kimball $377,132.00 plus interest. Worthington & Kimball sought confirmation ot 
the arbitration award and enforcement of its mechanic's lien on the suoject property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Tne trial court confirmed the arbitration awara in tavor of Worthington & 
Kimball with the sole modiiication of a reduction in the interest rate provided in tne 
arbitration award. The trial court denied the foreclosure of Worthington & Kimball's 
mechanic's lien on the basis that tne lien was not properly perfected due to a defective 
verification. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Worthington & Kimball seeks relief in three particulars. First, Worthington 
& Kimball seeks a determination by this court that its mechanic's lien substantially 
complies with the veritication requirement. Second, in the alternative, that the 1985 
amendment to the mechanic's lien statute repealing the verification requirement be 
applied to the instant case. Third, that the interest rate awarded oy tne arbitration 
panel be reinstated. 
STATEMENT Ob FACTS 
In July of 1980 C & A Development Company and Worthington & Kimball 
entered into a contract for the construction of a builoing to house the manulacturing 
process tor Permaloy Corporation. (R. 1,R. 1119, Ex. P-2) C & A Development Company, 
an Arizona corporation, subsequently assigned the contract to C & A Enterprises, an 
Arizona partnership. (R. 1120) Affiliates of C & A had recently acquired controlling 
interest in Permaloy Corporation. Payments were made by C & A to Worthington & 
Kimball with little difficulty until tne conclusion of the project. Wortnington & ivimoall 
submitted its last pay request in November of 1981 for the sum of $445,833.00. (Ex. 
R. 1127, P-214) C & A failed to pay the balance due on the contract ana asserted 
various and sundry reasons why it did not have to make the final payment. Near the 
completion of the project First Interstate Bank of Arizona loaned C & A $2,300,000.00 
secured by a Trust Deed on the subject property dated November 1, 1981 recorded 
November 30, 1981. (R. 1120) 
Worthington & Kimball had never before filed a mechanic's lien on this or 
any other project. A mechanic's lien, however, had been filed on this project by a 
subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball. Said mechanic's lien was prepared by the 
law firm of Kay, Quinney and hebeker. (Ex. P-2i7) Worthington & Kimball using said 
mechanic's lien as a guide, prepared a mechanic's lien ot their own. Cbx. P-219) Lawin 
Kimball, one of two general partners oi Worthington & Kimoall, took said mechanic's 
lien together with documents from which he could establisn the iirst and last aate ol 
pertormance of work and appeared before a notary public employed at Otto buener &c 
Co. (R. Partial Transcripts ot lestimony of Edwin Kimball, pages 2 - 5 and 2 - £) 
ivir. Kimball's testimony was uncontrovertea that: (1) he appeared before tne notary 
public with the documents that he had brought; (2) the notary wanted to see ivir. 
Kimball's driver's license to compare signatures; (3) the notary informed Mr. Kimball 
that the notary seal was for the purpose of identifying Mr. Kimball and his oath; (4) 
that Mr. Kimball had taken the oath and properly signed the lien; (5) tnat Mr. Kimball 
was informed by the notary that affixing his seal to the lien stipulated tnat Mr. Kimball 
had appeared before him, and under oatn, had signed the lien and indicated tnat ii was 
true anu correct and that Mr. Kimoall had personal knowledge of its contents; ana 
(6) that Mr. Kimball told the notary that the contents of the lien were true. (R. 
Partial Transcripts of Testimony ot Edwin Kimball, pages 2 - 5 and 2 - 9 ) Mr. Aimball 
then proceeded to file the mechanic's lien in the Weber County Recorder's otiice. 
Wortiiington & Kimball continued to try to obtain payment of the oalance 
due on the contract, but its efforts were in vain. Worthington & Kimball then initiatea 
a demano lor arbitration on May 25, 1982, before the American Arbitration Association, 
pursuant to the contractual provision. Worthington 6c Kimball subsequently obtainea 
counsel who filed a complaint for breach of contract and for foreclosure of the previously 
filed mechanic's lien. (R. 1) Simultaneously, counsel filed a motion to stay said 
proceedings pending the determination of the contractual issues in the arbitration 
proceedings. (R. 8) 
The arbitration panel was chaired by the senior partner of the Salt Lake 
City law firm of Fabian & Clendenin, Peter W. Billings. George h. L.yman, Esq., and 
B. Lue Bettilyon, an experienced contractor, also served on the panel. (R. 44) C & A 
asserted a counterclaim in excess ot a million dollars. The arbitration consisted of 17 
days of hearing during which in excess of 20 witnesses were called, including several 
expert witnesses. The transcript oi the proceedings exceeded three thousand pages. 
The panel also made a visit to tne construction site. Both parties to the arbitration 
filed extensive post hearing and reply briefs. On November 7, 1983 the arbitration 
panel awarded Worthington & Kimball the sum of $377,131.00 together with interest at 
the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum from December 1, 1981 until paid by C & A 
(R. 44). 
C & A refused to pay tne sum awarded, wortnington & Kimball fileu a 
motion in the pending action to confirm the arbitration award. (R. 41) Said arbitration 
was confirmed by order of the trial court on January 23, 1984. (R. 166) Worthington 
6c Kimball then sought to toreclose its mechanics lien. The issues were tried to the 
court during a tour day trial. The court found (1) that Worthington oc Kimball in the 
performance of its contract with C 6c A pertormed the first work on July 15, 1980 and 
did tne last work on November 12, 1981 (R. 1122); (2) that all of the work performed 
during said time period was necessary to complete the contract between Worthington 
& Kimball and C & A together witn appropriate cnange orders (R. 1122); (3) that the 
work performed during the months of August, September, Uctober and November of 
1981 was required under the terms and provisions of the contract oetween the parties 
and was made in pursuance of the natural and reasonable fulfillment of Worthington 6c 
Kimball's obligation under its contract and was not made lor tne purpose ot extending 
the time of filing a lien (R. 1126-27); (4) that the work was not aone a long time after 
the principal work had been completed but was pertormed within the time frame for 
the reasonable completion of the contract between the parties and was not delayed for 
the purpose of extending time to file a notice of lien (R. 1127) and; (5) tnat tne items 
of work were not trivial or minor but were made in good faith to complete tne contract 
between the parties (R. 1127). 
The court also tound that the amount due and owing to Worthington oc 
Kimball by C & A was the sum of $377,132.00 of which $2,355.00 was personal property 
for which a mechanic's lien would not apply leaving a balance due and owing subject 
to the Utan mechanic's lien statute of $374,776.00. (R. 1130) 
The court found that the mechanic's lien of Worthington & Kimball was not 
properly verified and was therefore null and void. (R. 1130, 1132) The court also held 
that it appeared that the 15% interest awarded by the panel of arbitrators was a penalty 
and theretore reduced the prejudgment interest rate to ten percent (10%) per annum. 
(R. 1130) During the pendency of the proceedings, Pemaloy Corporation vacated the 
premises. First Interstate Bank of Arizona subsequently foreclosed on the property by 
foreclosing its Trust Deed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jurat of the mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball, tne unpaid 
general contractor, substantially complies with the requirements of Utah Code Section 
38-1-7 (1953). The fact that the jurat does not specifically mention the word "oath" is 
not fatal since the jurat states that Edwin Kimball, a partner in Wortnington & Kimball, 
read the contents of the lien ana that the contents were true of his own knowledge. 
This is especially true since Edwin Kimball discussed the oath with the notary public 
and his swearing to the truth of the contents of tne lien so as to comply with the 
requirements for an oath set forth in Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1983). 
In the alternative only, assuming that under the pre-1985 amendments to 
Utah Code Section 38-1-7 this Court is of the opinion that a oefect exists wnich voias 
the $374,000 lien of the general contractor, tne 1985 amendments deleting the verification 
requirement should be applied to this case. It is appropriate to apply said amenaments 
since the revision to the mechanic's lien law is remedial in nature. 
Finally, the lower court!s modiiication of the interest rate provided by the 
arbitration award exceeded the lower court's authority and was without justifiable basis. 
The arbitrators had evidence upon which tiiey could base the interest rate award and 
had authority to make such an award. The modification should oe reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW WAS ENACTED 
TO PROTECT THOSE WHO PERFORM LABOR AND 
FURNISH MATERIALS ON CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS. 
The purpose of the Utah mechanic's lien statute is to protect those wno 
have added directly to the value of real property by performing labor or furnisning 
material for the improvement ot the property. From early in the history of this State 
this Court has held: 
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien law 
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those 
who perform the labor and furnish the materials which 
enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement. 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241, 244 (1917). More recently 
this Court stated in Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2o 184, 341 P.2d 207, 
209 (1959) that the purpose of the lien statutes is to protect those who nave addea 
directly to the value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon it. 
.: * «. ^fHI*ite w-ib 'o *e liberally construt-c U- ulve 
POIN , :. 
THE UTAH MECHAiNiL/b i . . • LA1 ' IM I " II 
CONSTRUED BROAnr \ 
Not jiiiy is the statute designed to protect those who impr...v*. t r-.{» 
the isuiiiiM1 r i i i uiistruecj broaolv. i iirse two principles were discuabeo :>^  ( i> 
Court in the recent ease ul Interiors totilnjcliiii;, lui. v. Navalco, "MH I* • , ±ot>J 
(Utah 1982): 
The , .. . . . . . . ,-..,.. .*iecnanicsf iitn ia^ v is to 
prov.v,, election to those who enhance the value of 
a propertj jy supplying lauor or materials. First oi 
Denver Mortgage Co, v. Zundel, Utah, 600 P.2d 521 
(1979). We construe the lien statutes broadly to 
effectuate that purpose. See Stanton Transportation 
Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959). 
POINT HI 
THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEiM ILVU- l< l-.gt IfilvS " "hi/1! 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. 
*r-oi., ....,n» '.ip, ;,r- , . ,; >opn LS; icat ct * -. * ; lecnnicaiities, 
number of defect- . i- . u -.je , nee ^; lien is 
at > -» /i-* ' - V'»- aifain reaffirmed •- ;u.siuoi uiai '.•*< . .* . .I4L oi 
subbi~..;.u. nlicabilr me mecnanic^ iio:. wi^lutc. 
orai l v. Loi-< ioeaae uorp, bbO «- .* 721 (Utai .-o •)• 
POINT IV 
THE MECHANICS LIEN RECORDED BY 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL ON JANUARY 14, 1982 
IS IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE 
SECTION 38-1-7 (1953). 
Assuming that the mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball is required 
to be verified, no particular form for verification is required by the statute. Further, 
this Court recently reaffirmed, in the case of Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 
721 (Utah 1983), that "substantial compliance" is the standard by which to juage tne 
jurat. The jurat on the Notice of Lien filed January 14, 1982 by Worthington <k Kimball 
constitutes a sufficient verification. 
Comparing the jurat in the subject Notice of Lien witn tne statutory 
acknowledgement form clearly shows that the subject jurat was much more tnan an 
acknowledgement. 
The statutory form (Utah Code Ann. Section 57-2-7) of acknowledgement is 
as follows: 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , 
personally appeared before me , the 
signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
The jurat used to verify the lien in question is in the following form: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 13th day of January, 1982, personally 
appeared before me Edwin N. Kimball, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has executed this notice 
and that he has read the contents thereot, and the 
same is true of his own knowledge. 
/ s / Arnold AUreo 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 6586 W. 3500 S. 
My Commission Expires: 
18 Sept. 1985 
Thereiur* • • -u u-njiowrougemen* 
contended before ia< ir^ f - , a : o\ jueiencian; - : KLUOLU;' . .* -.» ; 
qr^uicanth coiuaus the statements ihai ..v.win 
Kimball has re . u.t. ^lUv^.,^ . . . . .
 : _„ 
own knowledge, 
'I n,i
 ( W n CISPS (lH<'HlfMl i r a n i m i>y liiis i.oml invalidating liens cue to the 
lack of verification are clearly distinguishable from the instant •• • --• . u ^ .j« v. -^
 : ^ 
Mortgage t o , u. uanseru ti.'il IV2d 919 (IIIHII 1981), this Court :,« .<. rj mechanic's ncn 
invalid because ot a loiai laci, m compliance ini 1111 iiiiiii * • i 
that case the notice of lien contained only a simple statutory corporals riCMiowieufccihent. 
n 
The acknowledgement in this case did not contain even 
a general verification of the subject matter of the 
notice of claim. The only fact that was sworn to was 
the identity and authority of the person signing the 
claim. There is no suggestion that he personally 
vouched for the accuracy of the facts underlying the 
claim. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 
Since there was no statemei . » . . * . i 
lien and knevi at' his own knowledge that the contents were true tne lien was la tally 
defective, I In jiiiM m lh sa l^c l In i i- u i. istinfc'uishable since it provides that 
Edwin Kimball "has executed tt lis notice and I hat ^ * ; I'uultii1 I, 
.ii11! 'lit* saiin1 if,' true nf" his aiA/n knowled) ." Mr. lUmbuil aei'imter, vouched ••:• the 
accuracy ot" lite facts unJurlyinu Ui«i I'IJINI. 
In Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2a 721 (Utah 1983), the lien was 
bjgiit1*.1 Ilh "" M M i n i 1 1 1 " I " ' . [ H M ' i l
 ( 'In name of thr person who had read tl ie contents 
of the lien nor was there a signature lo idenlily I lie persoi I. 
In order to adopt defendants contention, it must be 
assumed that the name and tne signature of Berk 
Buttars were intended to be affixed on the blank line 
provided for verification of the notice of claim. We 
are not free to make those assumptions. (Emphasis 
added). 
Ic^ at 722. 
This Court concluded that the notice of claim of lien lacked substantial 
compliance with the verification requirement and was therefore defective. 
In the instant case, the lien was properly signed by Edwin Kimball. Further, 
the jurat clearly identities Edwin Kimball as the individual who read the contents of 
the lien ana stated that the contents were true of his own knowledge. Therefore, this 
Court does not need to make either of the two assumptions that the Graff Court could 
not make. 
A case with similar facts is Fircrest Supply, Inc. v. Plummer, <*0 Wash. App. 
384, 634 P.2d 891 (1981). The registered agent signed the claim directly above the 
jurat. His name was typed in the jurat identifying him as the claimant who heard the 
foregoing claim and read and knew the contents tnereof to be true. There was no 
turther signature of the registered agent below the jurat. The court held tiiat the 
statutory verification requirements for a lien claim were substantially satisfied. 
Another similar case is Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, Inc., 412 P.2d 
496 (Alaska 1966). As in that case, the claimant signed the claim form but not again 
below the jurat. The claimants name, however, was typed in the jurat as Having read 
the contents and stating that the contents were true of his own knowledge. The notary 
properly signed. The court held that there was "substantial compliance" with the statute. 
An almost identical factual and more recent case is Anchorage Sana ana 
Gravel Co. v. Woolridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980) where the Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed a lower courtTs invalidation of a lien. The claim of lien was signed by a Buff 
V. Jacobsen and followed by a notary's jurat stating: 
THIS CERTIFIES tl lat on this 11th day.of Oct< . 
rilVH, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Pubh :;-. 
and for Alaska, duly commissioned and sworn as sucn, 
personally appeared Buff V. Jacobsen known to me to 
be the corporate Secretary of the above entitled 
corporation and (s)he acknowledged that (s)he signed 
and sealed the foregoing instrument freely and 
voluntarily on begalf of said corporation, being duly 
authorized to act on behalf of said corporation by its 
board of Directors, and (s)he acknowledged that the 
facts recited in the above Claim of JLiei are known 
to him/her and (s)he hereby V 6 T 1 J - * *• •; -wild ,tOi.fti 
are true and correct. 
alli\k&> ivi\ H A N D AND SEAL the day and year 
ii: :i * eertilieatc *':;*'-t above written. 
/ s / _ _ 
N</I \Kv PUBLIC In anil I in Ww>ka 
L . :-•* * at was simply a variant of 
a corporate acknowledgement, 'wit* court aiai^». 
The jurat in tl le case at bar clearly goes furtl ten 
it contains a corporate acknowledgement plus the 
• following statement by a notary: 
"(s)l le acknowledged that the facts recited in the 
above Claim of Lien are known to him/her and 
(s)he hereby verifies that said facts are true and 
correct." 
Mr 
The court also rejected the contention that the jurat must exr^-.\ ._ -i 
lini fii'iiiii.'iiil made on outh. The fourl held: 
We conclude that wi tei i a lien claimant, in tl le presence 
of a notary, affixes his signature to a written statement 
incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of 
lien, and the notary certifies this act, claimant has 
substantially complied with the requirement of an 
"oath." 
!.. * ' *-"ie Worthington & Kii .„, ,oi.c* . .. . -. .A 
rements oi me Utah Code, it specifically identifies tnai :,cvui. ••_;
 t uai. 
the one who signed the lien, appeared before the notary and stated that he nad read 
the contents of the lien and that the same is true of his knowledge. 
While the jurat does not specifically mention that Mr. Kimball took an oath, 
such fact is not fatal. As mentioned above, the case of Anchorage Sana and Gravel, 
supra, held that when a lien claimant, in the presence of a notary, affixes nis signature 
to a written statement incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of lien, and 
the notary certifies this act, the claimant has substantially complied witn the 
requirements of an "oath." It should be noted that the case of H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical 
Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977) was cited as authority. The 
H.A.M.S. case is cited by this Court in both the First Security Mortgage and Graff 
cases in support of the importance of the verification. 
The case of Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 Outah 1984), discusses 
what constitutes the taking of an oath. The majority opinion does not answer the 
question of the dissenting opinion as to the applicability of tne holding to mecnanicfs 
lien actions. If the holding is applicable to mechanic's lien actions, the uncontrovertea 
testimony of Edwin Kimball indicates that the Coleman requirements have been met. 
Citing McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 titan 2d 238, 381 P.^d 726 Ubb^; 
tne Coleman Court set forth these essentials of an oath: 
1. A solemn declaration. 
2. Manifestation of an intent to be bound by the statement. 
3. Signature of declarer. 
4. Acknowledgment by an authorized person that oath was taken. 
Coleman at 31. 
The Coleman Court rejected the validity of a police officers report stating: 
The foregoing precedents set by this Court require a 
tunital verbal affirmation in order for a statement to 
be validly sworn to. We thus conclude that since the 
patrolman failed to verbally affirm or swear to the 
validity of the contents of the report, the report was 
not validly sworn to. 
Coleman at 31 
lidiAii i l\ n IIINII! i ulidlUi, .if t mi'ii i mi I In i I'oritonts of the mechanics lien. lie 
did ru-i suiolv ign the w--. .1 .u- - n.. ..« me ^ic^-nct L^ ,,* -, 
Wf - ' ''feoMii^ ' •• • *>.*. -i j ' - t .uecnanic's Ua ;:..* 
Kimuau hau ia^u ,^ , . eu ui iu x^ e 
appeared before the notar\ with uit .^ .n , tni : ; , v^* -*•- me ^-M* r* fho r ma 
lasi ' nai ni> seal I ?:«. the purpose ;J1" j-jcniiiving 
him hi: uu* CM. > a;K, i:.a * 11*1 ^i^uci* un. < ^cument uhou 
tlv "*: - r.'c**- ^ the iiui; were 1 ,n. r; . tiai *v nscript o: testimony 
of Edwin KimbaJL. •,.... 
.Recalling tin
 it ,~ of McKnight, which case produced the te>, 1; ooleman, 
«.-. , *> ^r *w 'H^-n/Mti^n -^vveei* *»:\ tumoaU . • .t 
no tan, , < ^uiremeut^ : j.eiu^.0 
in blank and as state'* •> * * * : 
I le c* » • us time. .,..., -"^ ni
 : »-4.v r^ 
with 1 - notary public] -*t various ie&se 
applications, ,:M-^mnb those hei» iv referred to. 
There is no question as to the ^,mentieity of [the 
applicant's] signature. There was an uncerstanding 
between [the applicant] and [the notary public] that 
] the notary public] would fill in accurate descriptions 
of the property to be leased on the applications. From 
these facts the Land Board held the oath valid." 
iVicKin 'a le ffThe administration [of the oati ij need 
. / any set pallet. r in.ua* : secondary iiiiporlMii'i .IIK! !U i J (Vet 
*. «.* > liiiijj'Iil i MI ifrmjssecj the ovonts with 
the notary vu.^e \UK policf otficer i . toparently had no discussion whatsoever. 
Mr. Kimball went even further than the applicant in McKnight since Mr. Kimball actually 
discussed the oath with the notary and told him the contents of the lien were true. 
There was no such evidence of any discussion of an oath between the applicant and 
the notary in McKnight. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the mechanic's lien of Worthington 6c 
Kimball substantially complies with the verification requirements of the statute, including 
the requirement ot an oath. 
POINT V 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 38-1-7, AS 
AMENDED EFFECTIVE APRIL 29, 1985, APPLIES TO 
THE CASE AT BAR 
A. SINCE THE MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW IS 
PROCEDURAL IN NATURE, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED SECTION 38-1-7, AS AMENDED, IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE LIEN FILED BY 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7 was amended effective April 29, 1985 to, 
among other things, delete the requirement of a verification when filing notice of a 
mechanics lien. Appellants Notice of Lien complies with the revised statute in every 
respect. 
The amended statute is applicable to Appellants lien notice even though 
the notice was filed and the trial judgment was entered eleven days before the revised 
statute became effective. This Court has applied amended statutes to causes ot action 
that accrued before the revised statute became effective when the revision was purely 
remedial or procedural in nature. See Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2o 589 (1948), 
and Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909). 
This Court, in Petty, aistinguisneo remedial, or procedural, law from 
substantive law as follows: 
Substai itive law is defined as the positive law which creates, 
defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and 
which may give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished from 
adjective (or procedural) law which pertains to and prescribes the 
• practice and procedure , by whiHi the substantive law is 
determined or made effective. 
iJoU?y 11 ;>93-94. 
The ii! . . iix-,.v, ,. c y i d 460 (\jtm- id83j [Pj rocedural 
statutes enacted subsequent ic tne mituUior. -t . . .iai0*. 
in \* jt-luai vv i r ,M- * u iu r t f : l iou>. , a , „,. > 
accrued and pending actions as well. WL HI IVI K'ning Slate v. HigK.^  r>o r.Zu bb*>, 
1000 (Utau. 
alner brothers Company v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922, y24 lUtan ibbz; tnat; I-IC ^ u i^-* ^ ,;* **iManic's lien a»*t JI- rcMiiediai 
ii ; urc a/ic ir^k' V~> ^roi>ifie protection to laborer- ,i ... materialmen who have added 
directly - . . •«ia 11 n;i Is or kibo",""1 I lie 
rights wnich ' • «..ecnaiucTs lien statute L- uesigne« .• , /*oct art* created nol when 
X , * ,n,
 t^ (»Ms Mrs tne project. In in unison 
v. Cart , . itnyivtiiii i.iiii iirhiT 
enactment • •'- •*" ^ .»<*i snip's L< f , statec uiai: 
[I] t is evident that the i«*nb - .* < statement does not create 
the lien, for the language of UA. iiatute is :,any party claiming 
a lien shall file," etc. but simply holds it in force for the time 
of one year . . . so as to give the claimant an opportunity to 
enforce the same by process of law. 
Id. at zjy (Lmphasrs added). 
Later in the Morrison opinion this ^ ' ' r 1 —ncluded that imj .„ legislature 
. . • attach on the uai*- -v- •'•^•r fn.; u enen^ i- ** .nd 
that the lien may be later lost il the statement as ; ..,.. t 
24] Although Morrison inlcrpreteu prior Utah mechanic7 aen ia\\, tnt law discussed 
in that case is substantially uiinuui i i * • x notateu Section Jb-1-
7. This judicial interpretation of the nature of the mechanic's lien law must be 
considered persuasive in the absence of later decisions. 
Previous Utah mechanic's lien law has also been reviewed by the United 
States Supreme Court. In Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1 (1896), the 
Court stated that "the right i[in the mechanic's lien statute] consisted of the right ot 
sale of the property in order, if necessary, to obtain payment of the money due tne 
contractor. The remedy consisted of the taking of certain proceedings by which this 
sale was to be accomplished." 164 U.S. at 13. Garland reinforces the idea tnat the 
rights of a contractor accrue as work is accomplished on the project; the later filing of 
a mechanic's lien statement is simply a proceuural step, "the taking of certain 
proceedings," to perfect the lien. Any statute must be regarded as merely procedural 
which does no more than direct the form the notice of lien must be in in order to 
properly attach and which in no way affects the substantive rights of the contractor 
which came into being at the time the work was done. 
The Utah Legislature intended the amendments to Section 38-1-7 to oe 
procedural only. At the third reading of House Bill 56 (which became the revised 
Section 38-1-7) before the Utah Legislature, Representative Holt, sponsor ol the bill, 
stated that the purpose of the Bill was "basically to simplify the procedures so that 
anyone can file a mechanic's lien and not need to have to obtain services of an attorney 
or something like it. It is just to make it a little simpler or a little easier for people 
that may be affected and want to file a lien." Transcript of third reading discussion 
of H.B. 56, January 17, 1985 8:00 a.m. (Emphasis added). (See Addendum) During 
legislative discussions of the proposed amendment, Rep. Holt stated that "the purposes 
of this [bill] is just to simplity and get away from technicalities I oon't think have 
any part with our procedures and our idea of what mechanic's liens are for, and that's 
all this bill [addresses]." Business, LaDor Committee Minutes, January 17, 1985, 8:00 
a.m., at 2 (Emphasis added). Rep. Holt further stated that ?Ht]his [completing the lien 
* it a mater ia lman ought to be able to do on his own to p r o t e c t 
il±L \i-nipi.asis aucieaj, iin> imijiskitui t"1
 ( inlr i ihnu h iiin!if\ onlv procedural 
aspec ts , as well as the Ijf^islaturc^s belief tha t the JJOII riyiu IJAL>L pi nut lu iihiig 
UOIUM' , is. appan.MiL, • :' 
The s i tuat ion under which a m e u n a ^ e .*-_ ..- u : •* 
foot
 a ! 1y *>* : . «^ x t, |A fjiiiiH" re qu j re in e n ts for a lien ire procedure Jiujy* < ML- *.«A t-i ,1 
a constru,:*-^ ^ ^ u i .tr *T-T or ihcontractor 
begin- vu)?\ thht .\./i> ^ oemg done - K> pruutrrl) ±. ..*« .i.-.. ^^ ^ 
uiiere&t i - . sricnment accrue t 
owner :^ me .i, jruvemenU are eomp;_t« , . ier ab 
the result of an express written. > * 'ontra«- • ne uu-eLniu * < < '"^iH 
meruit^ ait ouiigaimn i nipt - - - haierials 
incorporated into the project. The purpose • . i*euin-. , * L. . 
tin* I'll nil rut1 fdir im ii in a means of recovering these monies that he has already earned by 
furnishing his labor and maltMM.il,- See bear Lake Irrigation Company v. UarlaiuJ, i .pru, 
Morrison v, Kerry-Lombard Company, supra, Calder Brothers Company v. Anderson, 
supra. 
Other jurisdictions have «]«*o K ^ 
nature and that changes in mechanic's uen tiling procedures may be applied rt h'oaetively. 
In Hansen-Snyder v. General Mot*>. - * .,.,, • >ri< v -chigan 
Supreme Court retroactively appliee n staiutu; «
 a CU^UM-MI u x u ^ i i ^ , »a 
' ^ P C H H M I * * ^ ^ O I : l r r IX t <. > " , i , r> i t i r s t 
iunushing laboi solely 
to proc^du^p * v f-. teetuuti i te the. s t a t^ i :rv n . t airea< \ '*\ibimt, an^ mu/Liuiv. vjould 
•ah Savings ana Loan - i ^oc ia t ion v> 
.-eiMa;:i. l \ -n - . - :-.*o ,>98 (1961). 
In S & R Builders & Suppliers, Inc. v. Marler, 610 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. App. 
1980) the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a change in their mechanic's lien law 
allowing a lien to be filed on three acres of land rather than one acre could be 
retroactively applied. The court reasoned the change was remedial in nature and that 
the legislature expressed no contrary intention that the amendment should be prospective 
in effect only. In Kopp's Rug Company, Inc. v. Talbot, 5 Kan. App. 2d 565, 620 P.2d 
1167 (1980), the Kansas Court of Appeals retroactively applied an amendment allowing 
proof of receipt of a copy of a mechanics lien as adequate notice of the lien to others. 
In Denver Wood Products Company v. Frye, 202 Neb. 286, 275 N.W. 2d 67 (1979), the 
Nebraska Court held that a change in the mechanic's lien law extending the filing time 
from three months to four months applied to all proceedings even if the right accrued 
before the amendment became effective. In each of these cases, the court retroactively 
applied revised statutes even though the lien may have been invalid under the old 
statute. The courts apparently reasoned that rights under the mechanic's lien statute 
accrued at the time the work was done, and that changes in the filing or noticing 
procedures did not affect those existing rights. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also applied statutes retroactively in areas 
other than mechanic's liens. In Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 168 P. 2d 689 (1954), the Court retroactively applied a 
statutory amenament extending time for employer liability in workmen's compensation 
cases. The Court said that "a law is retrospective in its legal sense, which takes away 
or impairs vested rights acquireu under existing laws or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or 
considerations already passed (citations omitted)." The Court held that the statute in 
question was procedural, reasoning the rights of the employee to claim compensation 
had accrued previously as part of the employer-employee relationship, ana that tne 
employer had already incurred an obligation to pay if the employee contracted a work-
related illness. Therefore, no new duty was imposed on the employer and there was 
no unacceptable retroactive application of the statute. 
The situation in Silver King is analogous to that in the case of a mechanic's 
lien. The owner of a project has already incurred an obligation to pay the contractor 
as the contractor completes his work. The owner of the project has been enriched to 
the value of the contractor's work and should not be allowed to retain this enrichment 
without compensating the contractor. The obligation to pay the contractor arises at 
tne time the work is done, not when the lien notice is filed. 
B. THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE IS AN 
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY. ANY AMENDMENT TO 
THE STATUTE IS THEREFORE REMEDIAL AND MAY 
BE APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
The Maryland Court in Aviles v. Eshelman Electric Corp., 281 Md. 529, 379 
A.2d 1227 (1977) followed a different line of reasoning in deciding that changes to their 
mechanic's lien law should be retroactively applied. The Court held that the mechanic's 
lien is not a vested right but an extraordinary remedy only. Under this theory oi 
mecnanic's lien law, any change to a mechanic's lien statute would be remedial in 
nature and therefore could be retroactively applied. Previous Utah cases have stated 
that the purpose of the Utah mechanics' lien law is to "provide protection to those 
who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials." Interiors 
Contracting Incorporated v. Navalco, 648 P.2D 1382, 1385 (Utah 1982). See also Calder 
v. Davis, 652P.2d 992 (Utah 1982); Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d 162,567 P.2d 6031 (1970); 
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P2d 207 (1959); Rio Grande 
Lumber Co.v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241 (1917). This line of cases indicates that 
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently considered the mechanic's lien law to provide 
a remedy against nonpaying owners. If this court adopts the theory of Aviles, the 
question of whether the verification of the lien notice was substantive or procedural 
would become moot; the amendment to section 38-1-7 would automatically apply. Utah 
has consistently held that the lien statute provides a remedy; it would be both logical 
and just to adopt the Aviles position and apply the amended section 38-1-7 to the case 
at bar. To do otherwise, would deny a remedy to the very party the statute was 
intended to protect. 
C. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 68-3-3 DOES 
NOT BAR APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED SECTION 
38-1-7. 
The statutory bar to retroactive application of statutes, Utah Code Annotated Section 
68-3-3, is not applicable if the revised statutory amendment is intended only to clarify 
or amplify how the law is to be understood. Okland Construction Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)(retroactively applying an amended statute 
extending the maximum disability period in workmenTs compensation cases). The 1985 
amendments to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7 were similarly intended merely to 
clarify and amplify how the mechanic's lien law should be applied. 
Rep. Holtfs comments, supra, indicate the purpose of the revision to Section 
38-1-7 was strictly to simplify and clarify the intent of the legislature by making a 
mechanic's lien available to the public without requiring the services of an attorney. 
Under Okland Construction, therefore, the revised Section 38-1-7 should be applied 
retroactively to the case at bar. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The amendment to Section 38-1-7 in no way affects or changes any of the 
rights or obligations of either party under the contract. C & A could not have relied 
on the provisions of the previous statute in making its contract with Worthington & 
Kimball. The amended statute will not deprive any party of any rights that it had 
prior to the amendment; nor will it impose a new obligation on any party that did not 
previously exist in the contract with Appellant. The only obligation C & A has is its 
pre-existing obligation to pay Worthington & Kimball for the work done on its project. 
The amendment to Section 38-1-7 neither increases nor decreases that obligation, but 
merely changes the procedure by which Worthington & Kimball's right to foreclose is 
perfected. The amended version of Section 38-1-7 therefore must be applied to the 
case at bar. Appellants notice of lien is therefore in compliance with the applicable 
statutes and should be declared a valid lien against the property. 
POINT VI 
THE INTEREST AWARDED BY ThE PANEL OF 
ARBITRATORS SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
The contract between C & A ana Worthington & Kimball provides in article 
11.1.4 that payments due but unpaid shall bear interest at the rate the Owner is paying 
on his construction loan or at the legal rate, whichever is higher. (R. 60) In support ot 
its claim for interest, Wortnington & Kimball submitted a summary of its interest 
calculations as an exhibit in the arbitration. (A copy of said exhibit is included as 
Exhibit "A" in the addendum hereto). The panel of arbitrators, in the arbitration award, 
provided that interest would commence in December of 1981. (R. 48) Averaging tne 
applicable rates of interest on the aforementioned exhibit commencing in December of 
1981 (which period included times of high interest rates, which were costly to worthington 
& Kimball from December of 1981 through May of 1983, the month the arbitration 
hearings were begun) produced an average interest rate of 15.8%. (See Addendum) 
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, the rules by which the dispute was arbitrated, referred to in Article 16.1 
of the contract (R. 65) between the parties, provide, in Rule 43, entitled Scope of Award: 
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which 
is just and equitable and within the terms of the 
agreement of the parties. (R. 82) 
The arbitration award granted, among other things, the following: 
7. The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate 
of 15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from 
December 1, 1981 until paid by owner. We select that 
rate in part as a measure of damages to Worthington 
& Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the 
balance of the contract price. 
(R. 48) 
Pursuant to the arbitration rules, the arbitrators are entitled to grant any 
remedy or relief which is just and equitable. The panel of arbitrators, after hearing 
extensive evidence in the matter, including a counterclaim for over one million dollars, 
rejected the claims of C & A and awarded almost the entire contract balance to 
Worthington & Kimball. The arbitration panel chose the interest rate of 15%, which is 
not unreasonable and is supported by the average of the applicable interest rates set 
forth in the request of Worntington & Kimball. 
There is precedential authority for arbitrators to awara interest be^unu tne 
statutory rate. In the recent case of Morrison-Knudsen ana Co. v. Makahuena Corp., 
675 P.2d 760 (Hawaii 1983), the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld the arbitrators award 
of interest at prime plus 2% even though it was at odds with the Hawaii statute 
governing post judgment interest. The court concluded that what was labelea as interest 
was actually intended by the arbitrator as compensation tor damages. 
The interest award of the arbitrators to Worthington oc Kimball was likewise 
compensating for damages and not a penalty, as construed by the lower court. 
_ r>r> _ 
CONCLUSION 
The mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball substantially complies 
with the requirements of the Utah Code Section 38-1-7 prior to the amendments of 
1985 and fully complies with the requirements in said section after the 1985 amendments. 
The very purpose of the mecnanic's lien statute is to provide a means of securing 
payment to parties similarly situated to Worthington & Kimball. It would be extremely 
inequitable to deny recovery to Wortnington & Kimball wno, filing its first lien ever, 
copied a lien prepared by one of the premier law firms in Salt Lake, which would be 
deemed to have a super-technical defect in not mentioning the word "oath" in the 
jurat. If the jurat is deemed to be required, the jurat substantially complies with the 
mechanic's lien statute. The jurat identifies Edwin Kimball and clearly states that he 
personally vouched for the facts underlying the claim. Mr. Kimball undisputedly discussed 
the oath with the notary. That is a verification. The judgment of tfte lower court 
declaring Wortnington & Kimball's mechanic's lien null and void by reason of a detective 
verification should be reversed. 
Further, the lower court's modification of the arbitration award reducing 
the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrators should be reversed. The award was 
supportea by evidence presented to the arbitrators. Such award is within their powers 
in granting "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable." 
A. Respectfully submitted this 2$ day ot October, 1985. 
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NT/HCE OF MEN 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned Gary Jj . 
Worthing ton and Edwin N. Kimball d/b/a Wot: thing ton & Kimball 
i 
Construction Company, of l.indon, Utah, hereby claims and! 
intends to !,hold and claim a lien upon that certain real property 
owned arid reputed to be owned by C and A Enterprises an 
Arizona Corporation, which property is located in Weber County 
State of Utah, and is more particularly described as: 
Lot 9 Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial Park. 
jj 
The aforesaid lien is to secure payment of the sum of 
i 
Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Six Dolljirs 
and fifteen cents (430,585.15) plus interest accruing and! 
I 
other direct and related expenses owing and or accruing to 
Worthington and KimballConstruction Co. for labor and materia]s 
and 5jub-contractors hired by them or paid through then as a 
General Contractor for buildings and improvements in', on and 
about the said property. 
The foresaid indebtedness accrued and the foresaid labor 
it 
I, 
and materials were furnished to C & A Enterprises Inc, the 
i 
owner of the above described premises under a contract off 
construct.ion (with accrued change orders, extra work and additions) 
made and entered into between Worthington & Kimball Construction 
CD. as General Contractor and C & A Development Co. on the 
2nd day of July, 1980 by the terms of which Worthington fif 
Kimball Construction Co. did agree to con:;I ruct certain 
improvements on and about the said property and C & A Development 
did agree to pay there Core. 
(MI1 
UV- L A U I I \^KJ . 4JI u unu jam aay 01 juiy lyuu, and the lapt 
work was pet formed on the ]Jth-day ot hoveml.^c 100], The 
ambnll i^asonable value of the work performed by Worthington & Y 
construction Co. duting said period is the sum of Two Million 
Six Hundred Eighty Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty One 
Dollars ($2,605r551.00)aqainst which the sum of Two Million, 
Two Hundred Fifty Four Thousand, Nine Hundred and Sixty Four 
Lollars end Eighty Five cents ($2,254,964.05) has been paid 
by C & A Companies. The said payments lea^e a net balance 
due and owing to Worthington and Kimball Construction Co. of 
Four Hundred Thirty Thousand, Five Hundred Eighty Six Dollars 
and Fifteen Cents ($430,536.15), after deducting all just 
credits and oft sots pluc, an additional amount is owing for 
interest and other accruing expenses. For the said amounts 
and accruing amounts Wort'iirgton and Kimball Construction Co. 
holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-1-1 et seq (1953 as amended). 
Hated this day of Jan. 1902. 
Worthington and Kimball Const. Co, 
by 
STATL OF UTAH) 
County of <£\\LIQ)LQJ_ 
On this 1*3?* day of JonUQHI 1982^_, Pers$ 
appeared before me Edwin N. KmbalT, who -1--"1-- --' -^ 
me that ue has executed this notice and _ 
contents thereof, that the samexis^true of. his o^^yfowledge^^J^ 
./ARNOLD ALLRHD 1 
 , e r s o p ^ ^ S ! ^ 
duly a ck noj^MfloXl ' '6r*/ \ 
that he h j f eV^^N^^^ 
ni x i ^ t  . i  oi/l 
ary Public ^ ^ X ^ / V / 
iding . i t s X I ^ ^ C ^ S ^ ^ f i X L L ^ . ^ 
Not  
res 
Ky Commission expires 
(2) 
79 South Main (7 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 v 
(801) 532-1500 
PLATTED
 n VtlPIFlfD 
ENTERED ^ MICKOMIMED 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WIIOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that Hans R. Kuhni d/b/a Kuhni 
Concrete Company (hereinafter "Kuhni Concrete"), of Provo, Utah, 
hereby claims and.intends to hold and claim a lien upon that 
certain real property owned, and reputed to be owned by C and A 
Development Inc., which property is located in Weber County, State 
of Utah, and is more particularly described as: 
Lot 9 Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial Fark 
The aforesaid lien is to secure payment of the sum of Ten 
Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-Six ($10,096.00) owing to Kuhni 
Concrete for labor furnished by Kuhni Concrete as a sub-contractor 
in, on and about the said land. 
The aforesaid indebtedness accrued and the aforesaid 
labor was furnished to C and A Development Inc., the owner and 
reputed owner of the above-described premises, under a contract of 
construction (with accrued change orders, extra work and 
additions), made and entered into between Worthington & Kimball 
Construction, as original contractor, and Kuhni Concrete on the 
2nd day of July, 1980, by the terms of which Kuhni Concrete agreed 
to construct certain improvements on the said premises and 
Worthington and Kimball Construction did agree to pay therefor. 
The first work under said contract upon the described 
preminen won porformed by Kuhni Concrete on tin* l^th day of duly, 
1'JQO, nml tho 1 <ifit work prior to Worthington and Kimball 
Count rurl Inn'n l»n«.w h and icpudlallnn of tin* routiart wan |»nr -
fuimcM) on tho ?li.t «tay of IVhi II.II y, 1 <MU . Tim rra'toii.tMe v.ihio of 
thu wot k performed !»y Kiilml Conrrolo during nald period In t |ir» num 
Hundred and Seventy-Six Dollars (?71,876.00) has been paid by 
Worthington and Kimball Construction. The said payments leave a 
net balance due and owing to Kuhni Concrete of Ten Thousand Eight 
Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($10,896.00) after deducting all just 
credits and offsets. For said amount Kuhni Concrete holds and 
claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
DATED this 3/*r day of March, 1981. 
HANS R. KUHNI d/b/a/KUHNI 
CONCRETE CO. 
By: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this j3/f day of March, 1981, personally appeared 
before me Hans R. Kuhni, who duly acknowledged to me that he has 
executed this notice and that he has read the contents hereof, 
that the same is true of his own knowledge. 
• Notary P u b l i c / 
Residing at: Salt Lake County, Utah 
liy commissidn-. expires: 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Claimant, 
v. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, 
C & A ENTERPRISES, an 
Arizona partnership, and 
C & A COMPANIES, INC., an 
Arizona corporation, 
Respondents. 
This matter came before Peter W. Billings, George E. 
Lyman and B. Lue Bettilyon, sitting as a board of arbitrators, 
to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the per-
formance and interpretation of a contract originally between C & A 
Development Company, as owner, and Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company, a Utah general partnership and L. M. Hendriksen, dba 
Western States Construction, a sole proprietorship, as contractor, 
for the design and construction of a factory building to be occupied 
by Permaloy Corporation. 
Seventeen days of hearings were held on April 25 to 29, 
May 16 to 20, June 20 to 24 and July 14 and 15, 19 83 and the 
construction site was visited by the panel and representatives of 
the parties on July 14, 1983. In addition, the arbitrators met on 
July 5, 1983 to'review the evidence and to prepare suggestions to 
the parties as to the matters they believed should be covered by 
the post-hearing briefs. During the hearings both parties were 
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given full opportunity to call all witnesses they desired and 84 
exhibits were introduced by Worthington & Kimball and 59 by the 
respondents. Both parties were given opportunity to file and did 
file post-hearing and reply briefs. 
Under date of August 30, 198 3 Worthington & Kimball 
moved to reopen the hearing to determine the respective rights and 
liabilities of C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and 
C & A Companies, Inc. under any award made in these proceedings in 
light of an assignment of the original contract by C & A Development 
to C & A Enterprises in March, 1981. Under date of September 29, 
1983 the American Arbitration Association notified the parties that 
the arbitrators had agreed to reopen the hearings. Under date of 
October 18, 19 8 3 the parties were advised the reopened hearing 
would be held on October 24, 198 3, limited to evidence and argument 
as to whether any award can or should be made for or against any 
party other than the parties to the original contract, i.e., C & A 
Development Company as owner and Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company as contractor, and as to the allocation of costs and fees. 
Because of the inability of counsel for respondents to 
appear, the hearing scheduled for October 24, 1983 was not held. 
By means of a conference telephone call, the parties stipulated 
that in March, 1981 the contract between Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development Company was assigned by C & A Development to 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies 
is a general partner. The parties further agreed that respondents 
should have until and including October 28, 19 8 3 to respond in 
writing to the merits of the contentions of Worthington & Kimball 
set forth in their motion to reopen the hearing. 
The arbitrators, therefore, vacated the hearing set for 
October 24, 1983 and granted Worthington & Kimball until November 4, 
1983 to respond to any arguments presented by respondents as to 
the effect of the assignment on the rights and liabilities of 
C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and C & A Companies 
in the matter before the arbitrators. The arbitrators further 
directed that the memoranda to be filed by each party should also 
state the position of such party as to the assessment of costs and 
fees in this proceeding. 
After receipt of said briefs the arbitrators met on 
November 7, 19 8 3 and, based on the evidence heard, the exhibits 
introduced, the briefs of counsel and the visit to and inspection 
of the construction site, make the following Findings: 
1. On or about July 2, 1980 Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development Company entered into a contract on AGC Form No. 
6a "Design - Build Agreement between Owner and Contractor." The 
only significant amendment to that form made by the parties was in 
paragraph 2.5.2, to which was added the following language: 
Any and all test borings, soil sampling and pre-determined 
construction surveys and investigations (other than site 
survey) shall be done by contractor, if contractor fails 
or neglects to obtain such borings, testings, etc., 
contractor shall assume all liability for any failures in 
the building as a result of any deficiency that may 
result therefrom. 
2. We construe that language to mean that the parties 
intended that if (a) the contractor employed a competent person 
to conduct such borings, testings, etc., (b) fully informed that 
person of the general nature of the planned construction, (c) the 
borings, testings, etc., were performed and the report thereof 
was made in accordance with standards of the industry, (d) the 
plans and specifications provided by the contractor under paragraph 
2,1 complied with the findings and recommendations of the person 
employed to make such borings, testings, etc., and (e) the contractor 
followed such plans and specifications in the construction of the 
building, the contractor is relieved of any liability for any 
failures or defects in the building resulting from soil conditions, 
differential settlement and the like. 
3. In March, 1981, with the consent of Worthington & 
Kimball, the original contract between Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development was assigned by C & A Development "to C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies, Inc. 
is a general partner. In addition, the property on which the 
building was constructed was deeded by C & A Development to C & A 
Enterprises. By reason thereof, references in this award to "owner" 
shall be deemed to include both C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Development, jointly and severally. We believe any allocation of 
payment of the award is to be determined by agreement between them, 
without necessity of any ruling by the arbitrators. The obligation 
of C & A Companies, Inc. under the award is only as a general 
partner of C & A Enterprises and is determined by the provisions 
of Section 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated. 
4. The unpaid balance of the contract price, as adjusted 
by change orders as provided in Article 9 of the Contract, to which 
Worthington & Kimball is entitled to be paid as provided in Article 
11 of the contract, is $430,053.00, subject to such deductions 
therefrom as the arbitrators find to be warranted under the terms 
of the contract and the evidence received with respect to the claims 
of the owner. 
5. The owner is entitled to a reduction of the said 
unpaid balance in the sum of $52,922.00, allocated as follows: 
a. Repairs to asphalt in parking lots and drives, 
$25,125.00; 
b. Punch list items - this includes correction of 
cantilever area of roof over dock, $10,000.00; 
c. Repair of external walls due to separation and 
spalling, $2,500.00; and 
d. Credit for payments by C & A to Worthington & 
Kimball subcontractors, $15,297.00. 
6. All other claims of the owner have been carefully and 
fully considered, but are denied on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
a. Not the responsibility of the contractor; 
b. Not supported by the evidence; 
c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the 
contract between the parties, including the plans 
and specifications; 
d. Not quantified by reliable evidence; 
e. Not included within the scope of the work to be 
performed by the contractor; 
f. Barred by acts or failure to act of the owner; and 
g. Abandonment of the claim during hearings or in 
briefs. 
7. The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate of 
15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until 
paid by owner. We select that rate in part as a measure of damages 
to Worthington & Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the 
balance of the contract price• 
8. All other claims of the contractor have been fully 
and carefully considered, but are denied on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
a. Not the responsibility of the owner; 
b. Not supported by the evidence; 
c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the 
terms of the contract, including the plans and 
specifications; 
d. Already covered in change orders executed by owner 
and contractor; 
e. Not quantified by reliable evidence; 
f. Are otherwise contained in the award herein made; 
g. Barred by acts or failure to act of the contractor; 
and 
h. Abandonment of claim during hearings or in briefs, 
9. Owner shall pay to contractor the sum of $377,131.00 
plus interest as provided in paragraph 7 above upon the contractor 
filing with the office of the American Arbitration Association in 
Denver, Colorado lien waivers from the contractor and all its 
subcontractors. This requirement does not include Robert E. Lee 
doing business as Ogden Industrial Plastic, who we find is not a 
subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball. 
10. Administrative fees and arbitrators1 fees and 
expenses as determined by the American Arbitration Association office 
in Denver, Colorado shall be borne 75.0% by owner and 25.0% by 
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Worthington & Kimball. All other expenses shall be allocated as 
follows: 
a. The expenses of witnesses for either side shall 
be paid by the party producing such witness 
including witnesses produced in response to the 
arbitrators' letter to counsel dated May 27, 19 83; 
b. Cost of the stenographic record, equally between 
owner and Worthington & Kimball, unless they shall 
have otherwise agreed prior to the receipt of this 
award;* 
c. All other expenses of the arbitration, as described 
generally in paragraph 50 of the Construction 
Industry Arbitration rules, shall be born equally 
by the parties; and 
d. The nature and amount of such expenses shall be 
determined by the Denver office of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
DATED this ~7 tj- day of November, 1983. 
" ~ ^ ~ \ , ^ <Z)io,)Q 
Peter W. Billings, 
^ 
A-t-A. 
B. Lue Bettilyorr 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN of 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Otto Buehner & Company 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IK AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a ) 
Utah general partnership ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
GARY WORTHINGTON and ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general ) 
partners, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
an Arizona corporation, ) 
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona ) 
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE ) 
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A., ) 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF ) 
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A ) 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an ) 
Arizona corporation, ) 
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER & ) 
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY, ) 
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba ) 
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY, ) 
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING, ) Civil No. 83387 
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and ) 
JOHN DOES 1 through 24, ) 
Defendants. 
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The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the judges of the 
above entitled court, on December 3,4,5 and 6, 1984. Robert F. 
Babcock appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs, Uorthington 
and Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership, 
Gary Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners; Robert 
F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong appearing for and on behalf of 
C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, comprised of Frank 
S. Campbell, F. Richard Campbell, Gary Dee Jones, Robert A. 
Campbell and Robert F. Bentley, and C & A Companies, Inc., an 
Arizona corporation; LaVar E. Stark appearing for and on behalf 
of First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., and Stewart Title 
Company of Salt Lake City; Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on 
behalf of Otto Buehner & Company and Joseph Smith Plumbing. 
Whereupon the court heard the respective testimony of plaintiff 
and defendants in support of their Complaint and Counterclaims 
and Cross-claims for a period of four days and then having taken 
the matter under advisement, and now being fully advised in the 
premises, enters the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is an action by the plaintiff as the general 
contractor on an industrial project in Weber County, State of 
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, hereinafter designated as 
"Buehner Concrete". 
6. That Joseph Smith Plumbing is an individual 
proprietorship with its principal offices in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, hereinafter designated as "Smith PlumbingM. 
7. Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City is a title 
company with its principal office at 261 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter designated as "Stewart Title". 
8. That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., is an 
Arizona corporation, with its principal office at the Interstate 
Bank Plaza, P. 0. Box 20551, Phoenix, Arizona, hereinafter 
designated as "First Interstate". 
9. Permaloy Corporation, is a Utah corporation now in 
bankruptcy and was at all times herein a tenant or lessee of 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, hereinafter designated 
as "Permaloy". 
10. All of the other parties have not answered or have 
filed dismissals or are not material to this action. 
11. That on or about July 2, 1980, C & A Development 
entered into a construction contract with Worthington & Kimball 
for a manufacturing plant to be built on Lot 9 in the Weber 
Industrial Park in Weber County, Utah, hereinafter designated as 
the "subject property" for $1,977,813.00, attached hereto as 
Exhibit 2 of the trial exhibits. 
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12. That after entry into the contract between the 
above entitled parties, C & A Development, as owner, assigned the 
construction contract to C & A Enterprises. 
13. That on the 5th day of August, 1980, Worthington & 
Kimball entered into a subcontract with Buehner Concrete for the 
furnishing of concrete members (floor double tees inverted tee 
beams, column and rectangular beams) for the sum of $469,657.00. 
14. That Buehner Concrete furnished the first 
materials on the subject building and property on the 24th day of 
September, 1980, and furnished the last materials on the project, 
pursuant to its contract on the 19th day of February, 1981. 
15. That a Deed of Trust to secure an indebtedness on 
the subject building and property was given by First Interstate 
according to the following terms, conditions, amounts and time: 
Dated: November 1, 1981 
Trustor: C & A Enterprises 
Amount: $2,300,000.00 
Trustee: Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City 
Beneficiary: First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. 
Recorded: November 30, 1981, as Entry No. 848026 
in Book 1393, at page 1305 of official 
records 
16. A mechanic's lien was filed in Weber County by 
Gary J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and 
Kimball in the amount of $430,586.15, plus interest for labor and 
materials recorded January 14, 1982, as Entry No. 850356 in Book 
1396 at page 258 of official records, first work day being 
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7/15/80 and last work day being 11/12/81, hereinafter designated 
as Worthington & Kimball's first mechanic's lien. 
17. A mechanic's lien was filed by Buehner Concrete in 
Weber County in the amount of $46,966.00, plus interest for labor 
and material, recorded January 15, 1982, as Entry No. 850122 in 
Book 1396 at page 387 of official records, hereinafter designated 
as the Buehner mechanic's lien. 
18. A mechanic's lien was filed in Weber County by 
Joseph Smith Plumbing in the amount of $6,172.50, plus interest 
for labor and materials, recorded January 29, 1982, as Entry No. 
851211 in Book 1397 at page 24 of records, and re-recorded 
February 19, 1982, as Entry No. 852228 in Book 1397 at page 1753 
of official records, hereinafter designated as the Smith 
mechanic's lien. No Counterclaim or action was filed by Smith 
Plumbing to foreclose their lien and the parties stipulated that 
the lien is null and void as an encumberance against the property 
as herein set forth. 
19. A notice of lien was filed by Gary J. Worthington 
and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball Construction 
Co. in the amount of $430,586.15, plus interest for labor and 
materials, recorded February 8, 1982, as Entry No. 851656 in Book 
1397 at page 768 of official records, first work day being 
7/15/80 and last work day being 10/23/81, hereinafter designated 
as the Worthington & Kimball second mechanic's lien. 
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20. That the contract between Worthington & Kimball, 
C & A Development and C & A Enterprises, provided for arbitration 
and that an arbitration hearing was held between the parties and 
an award was made together with Findings of Fact on the 7th day 
of November, 1983, with Peter Billings, Chairman and George E. 
Lyman and B. Lue Bettilyon as arbitrators, which arbitration 
award was affirmed by the above entitled court on the 17th day of 
January, 1984, and is now part of the record in the above 
entitled matter, hereinafter designated as the Arbitration Award, 
21. That Worthington & Kimball in the performance of 
its contract with defendants, C & A Development Company, and 
C & A Enterprises performed the first work on the subject 
property and subject building on the 15th day of July, 1980, and 
did the last work on November 12, 1981, and that all of the work 
between July 15, 1980, and November 12, 1981, was necessary to 
complete the original, or general contract that Worthington & 
Kimball had with the C & A Enterprises, together with appropriate 
change orders. 
22. That on August 14, 1981, Worthington & Kimball 
gave to C & A Enterprises a Certificate of Substantial 
Completion, which is defined as follows: 
"The Date of Substantial Completion of the Work or 
designated portion thereof is the Date certified 
by the Architect when construction is sufficiently 
complete, in accordance with the Contract 
Documents, so the Owner can occupy or utilize the 
Work or designated portion thereof for the use for 
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which it is intended, as expressed in the Contract 
Documents." 
The court finds that the Certificate of Substantial Completion 
and the definition as given therein, and its purpose was not 
given by the parties as their intention that Worthington & 
Kimball's general contract and change orders had been completed, 
but that the project had reached the stage of completion that the 
Owner could start to commence to occupy the building, to install 
various machinery, tanks and other equipment which the Owner 
needed in order to carry on its manufacturing process. The 
document was never accepted by C & A Enterprises, among other 
things. 
The court finds that after August 14, 1981, that 
Worthington & Kimball performed the following work to complete 
its contract with C & A Enterprises as follows: 
DATE DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED 
8/15/81 Completed the general painting contract. 
8/17/81 Obtained materials for the boiler piping 
and installed them in the heating system 
for the manufacturing purposes of the 
C & A Enterprises. 
8/18/81 Worked on the boiler piping on the 
building. 
8/19/81 Obtained strap and other materials for 
hanging the boiler^ piping and worked on 
the project on this date. 
8/20/81 Picked up boiler piping, worked on the 
suspended ceiling to complete this work 
and drilled holes for the installation 
of the boiler piping. 
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8/21/81 
8/24/81 
8/25/81 
8/26/81 
8/27/81 
8/28/81 
9/1/81 
9/2/81 
9/3/81 
9/4/81 
9/8/81 
9/9/81 
Worked on the boiler piping. 
Worked again on the boiler piping and 
did weather stripping on the building. 
Picked up and installed three locks 
pursuant to the hardware schedule. 
Work on keying the doors and hinges and 
installed the bumpers on various doors 
and did additional work on the boiler 
piping. 
The landscape architect completed most 
of his work. Work wqs done on 
installing fittings in the boiler 
piping. 
Bases for the boiler pump were installed 
Louvers were installed for the furnaces. 
Sump at the ramp was poured and work was 
done on the electrical system. Work on 
the dampers was done. 
SEPTEMBER 1981 
Work was done on weather stripping for 
the building together with work to get 
the heat to the camera room. 
Electrical wiring was performed for the 
make-up air units. 
Continued wiring for the make-up units. 
Castors were installed for the large 
swing doors on the project. 
Work was done on the emergency lighting. 
Materials were obtained for painting the 
floors. 
Materials were picked up for the alarm 
system. 
Materials were picked up for the epoxy 
paint for the floor finish. 
-10-
9/10/81 The subcontractor picked up alarm 
equipment for the subcontractor's work 
on the project. 
9/11/81 Work on the boiler piping. 
9/21/81 Picked up sealers for the floors at 
Pratt & Lambert. 
9/22/81 Picked up acid to clean the panels in 
the front entry way and work was 
commenced on this particular project. 
9/23/81 ABC Fire Protection Equipment completed 
their contract on the fire sprinkling 
system for the building. 
9/30/81 Checked out the electrical wiring on 
Permatex. Color coded the three-phase 
electrical system on the project. 
Also greased and lubed the motors on the 
electrical equipment in the building. 
OCTOBER 1981 
10/1/81 Picked up the vents and piping. 
10/2/81 Washed the front entry way with acid. 
Prepared it for paint. 
10/5/81 Additional entry way cleaned. Patched 
the stairs with a first coat of 
materials. Worked on completing and 
keying the hardware. 
10/6/81 thru Checked out the electrical system, 
10/8/81 finished the walls in the building. 
10/27/81 On this date the general contractor's 
subcontractor for testing, Servco, 
check tested and started 4 Applied Air 
Heaters. Made adjustments, set 
controls, set input gas air. Set 
dampers and checked modulation and 
settings and calculated. Instructed 
personnel on operation. Remounted air 
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switch lines on two large units. 
Repaired Partlow modulation on small 
unit. The cost for this, which the 
parties testify was absolutely essential 
for the operation of the air units, was 
$326.50. 
10/26/81 Sealed the stairs with a second coat of 
sealer. 
10/27/81 thru Did the final electrical testing, 
10/30/81 checked out the miscellaneous punch 
items. Installed pans around the door 
locks so that when doors were open, the 
hardware would not push holes in the 
wall as they were opened. 
NOVEMBER 1981 
11/1/81 Instructed the owner in the operation of 
the mechanical design equipment for 
make-up air units over the tank lines. 
11/10/81 Installed scuppers and down spouts on 
the roof. 
11/12/81 Built and completed the drainage ditch 
around the building and sprayed the 
trees with wax sealer. 
23. The court finds that all of the items, many of 
which are mentioned and some which are not, were done to complete 
the building in the months of August, September, October and 
November, 1981, were required under the terms and provisions 
of Worthington & Kimball's contract with C & A Enterprises, and 
were made in the pursuance of the natural and reasonable fulfill-
ment of Worthington & Kimball's obligation under its contract and 
were not made for the purpose of extending the time of filing of 
a lien and none of them were done a long time after the principal 
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work had been done on the contract, and all of the reasons that 
were given pursuant to the evidence were satisfactory and 
reasonable to the above entitled court within the time frame for 
the reasonable completion of the contract between the parties and 
the court finds that they were not delayed for the purpose of 
extending time to file the notice of lien. The court further 
finds that the items were not trivial or minor, but were made in 
good faith to remedy defects or made in good faith to complete 
the contract between the general contractor and the owner, 
24. The court further finds that C & A Enterprises1 
Answer, Counterclaim in Arbitration also alleged that the 
contract between the two parties was not completed on November 
12, 1981, the last date that work was performed by the general 
contractor, and further allege that a punch list which they had 
furnished previous to this time had not been completed. 
25. The court finds that the application for final 
payment was not made until November 15, 1981, further indicating 
that the parties did not regard that final completion had 
occurred. 
26. The court finds that before final completion of 
all of the items under the contract between the general 
contractor and the owner, that the general contractor, 
Worthington & Kimball was ordered off the project because of a 
financial inspection that was going to take place on or about 
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November 10, 1981, which would indicate to a loaning institution 
that there were still items to be completed on the contract; and 
work was thereafter suspended at the request of and pursuant to 
the instruction of the C & A Enterprises• 
27. The court, therefore, finds that Otto Buehner & 
Company, as a subcontractor of the general contractor, filed its 
Lien on January 15, 1982, within 64 days after C & A Enterprises 
requested and directed Worthington & Kimball to leave and cease 
work on the project and the mechanic's lien was timely filed. 
28. A copy of the lien was mailed to the owner, C & A 
Enterprises, on January 18, 1982, and was acknowledged by the 
C & A Enterprises in open court as having been received and the 
court finds that although Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 
requires that the lien shall be delivered by certified mail, that 
the purpose of the statute was to assure notice and that where 
the C & A Enterprises duly admitted that they had received 
notice, that the certified mail requirement was of no 
significance and that regular mail satisfied the requirements. 
29. The court finds that the Otto Buehner & Company 
lien was properly verified and is a good and valid and 
enforceable lien pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, as of the time the first work was 
commenced on the premises as of July 15, 1980, and is prior in 
-14-
time to the mortgage of First Interstate Bank of Arizona and is a 
first and prior encumberance as to the interests of all of the 
defendants in this action. 
30. That the reasonable amount of labor and materials 
properly incorporated into the subject property, subject to the 
Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute by Otto Buehner & Company was the 
sum of $41,466.00 together with interest since December 1, 1981, 
in the sum of $13,820.00, or a total of $55,286.00, together with 
reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of $12,000.00 for enforce-
ment of its lien. The court holds that the legal rate for the 
enforcement of Otto Buehner & Company's lien is 10%. That all of 
the parties herein stipulated that the sum of $12,000.00 for 
services rendered herein by Otto Buehner & Company's attorney was 
reasonable. That the amounts provided in this paragraph of 
$55,286.00, together with $12,000.00 attorney f es, are included 
in the amounts due and owing by C & A Development and C & A 
Enterprises to Worthington & Kimball Construction and are further 
included in the arbitration award as herein set forth. 
31. That Otto Buehner & Company and Worthington & 
Kimball stipulated in open court that 15% interest would be due 
and owing on the Otto Buehner & Company contract. The court, 
therefore, finds that Otto Buehner & Company is entitled to a 
separate judgment against Worthington & Kimball, not included 
within the foreclosure decree for the sum of $3,749.94 as the 
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difference between the interest rate agreed between the parties 
and the legal rate awarded by the court. 
32. That Joseph Smith Plumbing furnished labor and 
materials of the reasonable value as hereinafter set forth to the 
project at the special instance and request of Worthington & 
Kimball, although it filed a mechanicfs lien, it did not 
foreclose the lien and it is entitled to a judgment against 
Worthington & Kimball for the sum of $6,172.50, together with 
interest at the rate of 10% from December 1, 1981, in the sum of 
$1,974.52 or a total of $8,147.02. 
33. That the amount due and owing to Worthington & 
Kimball by C & A Enterprises, is the sum of $377,131.00, together 
with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The court further 
finds that of this amount, $2,355.00 was personal property and 
was not properly lienable, leaving a balance due and owing, 
subject to the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute of $374,776.00, 
together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. It appears 
to the court that the 15% interest awarded in the Arbitration 
Award is a penalty and, therefore, the court is only awarding 
Worthington & Kimball 10% interest on the amounts as provided 
herein. 
34. The court finds that the first mechanic's lien of 
Worthington & Kimball was not properly verified and that the 
second mechanic's lien was superfluous in that the parties 
-16-
thought that the first mechanic's lien description was flawed, 
but it was sufficient to give notice. The court finds that all 
of plaintiffs1 mechanic's liens were not properly verified. 
35. That the reasonable value of the attorney fees by 
Robert F. Bentley, attorney for the C & A Companies, as the 
prevailing party on the lien foreclosure is $6,000.00 and the 
reasonable value of the attorney fees by LaVar E. Stark, as 
attorney for First Interstate Bank and Stewart Title of Salt Lake 
is the sum of $6,000.00. 
36. The court finds that Frank S. Campbell, F. Richard 
Campbell, Gary Dee Jones, Robert A. Campbell and Robert F. 
Bentley and C & A Companies, Inc. were partners of C & A 
Enterprises, but were not served with process in this action. 
Plaintiff, Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, a general 
partnership, should have the right to commence an appropriate 
action against the individual partners of C & A Enterprises, an 
Arizona partnership for a determination as to their liability 
under this Judgment, without any prejudice for failure to join 
the individual partners at the commencement of this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
concludes as a matter of law: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there is now due and owing from the 
defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, to Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary 
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners, the sum of 
$377,131.00, together with interest at the rate of 10%; the court 
further finds that of this amount, $2,355.00 was personal 
property and was not properly lienable, leaving a balance due and 
owing, subject to the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute of 
$374,776.00, which includes the amounts the amounts due and owing 
to Otto Buehner & Company, dba Buehner Concrete as provided for 
in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, exclusive of 
attorney fees. The mechanic's lien filed in Weber County by Gary 
J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball 
to secure the above amounts recorded on January 14, 1982, as 
Entry No. 850356 in Book 1396 at page 258 of the official 
records, is null and void and was not properly perfected because 
of the defective verification of the lien pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended. 
2. That there is now due and owing to the Otto 
Buehner & Company by plaintiff, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company the sum of $41,466.00 together with interest 
since December 1, 1981, in the sum of $13,820.00, or a total of 
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$55,286.00, together with reasonable attorneyfs fees in the sum 
of $12,000.00 for enforcement of its lien, which is secured by a 
good and sufficient Mechanic's Lien as provided for in Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, on the following described property: 
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial 
Park 
That the mechanic's lien of Otto Buehner & Company is prior in 
time and prior in priority to the interest of any of the other 
defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank 
of Arizona, N.A. , Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, 
Permaloy Corporation, Holbrook Company, Inc., Donald K. Lybbert 
dba Lybbert Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing 
Company, Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, Gary 
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, and that the above described 
property be foreclosed and sold by the Sheriff of Weber County, 
as in such cases made and provided and that the proceeds from the 
sale thereof after payment of the costs be applied first to the 
satisfaction of the amounts due and owing to Otto Buehner & 
Company as herein, and the balance, if any, to C & A Development 
Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona 
partnership, and C & A Companies, an Arizona corporation, First 
Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., as their interest may appear or 
as the above entitled court may determine. In the event that the 
proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy the amounts due 
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and owing to defendant, Otto Buehner & Company herein, Otto 
Buehner & Company shall have a deficiency judgment against 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company. The amounts due and 
owing to Otto Buehner & Company, exclusive of attorney fees are 
also included in the amounts due and owing in paragraph 1 of the 
Conclusions of Law, owing by C & A Development Company, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, 
and C & A Companies, an Arizona corporation, to Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Company. 
4. That C & A Development Company, an Arizona 
corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, are 
entitled to a reduction from the amounts due and owing to 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company for $6,000.00 as the 
reasonable attorney's fees for prevailing in the mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action and the failure of Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company to establish their mechanic's lien. 
5. That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. is 
entitled to a judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company for $6,000.00 as the reasonable attorney's fee for 
prevailing in the mechanic's lien foreclosure action and the 
failure of Worthington & Kimball Construction Company to 
establish their mechanic's lien. 
6. That there is now due and owing to the Otto 
Buehner & Company by Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, 
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the sum of $3,749.94 as the difference between the interest rate 
agreed between the parties and the legal rate awarded by the 
court. 
7. That Joseph Smith dba Joseph Smith Plumbing is 
entitled to a judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary Worthington and Edwin 
N. Kimball, general partners, for the sum of $8,145.04, together 
with interest as provided for by law. 
8. Any person acquiring any interest since filing the 
lien as herein specified shall be foreclosed of any right, title 
or interest as subscribed herein. 
9. That the rights and claims of the defendants, 
C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona, N.A., Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, Permaloy 
Corporation, Hoibrook Company, Inc.. Donald K. Lybbert dba 
Lybbert Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing 
Company, and Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and any 
other person or persons claiming by or through or under them be 
declared to be subject and subordinate to the mechanic's lien of 
the defendant, Otto Buehner & Company and such rights or claims 
of such defendants and such other persons be forever barred, 
subject only to redemption in the manner provided by law. 
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10. That the plaintiff, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company, a general partnership, shall have the right 
to commence an appropriate action against the individual partners 
of C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership for a determination 
as to their liability under this Judgment, without any prejudice 
for failure to join the individual partners at the commencement 
of this action. 
Dated this day of , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following parties 
by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert F. Bentley 
Attorney for C & A Development Co. and 
C & A Enterprises, Inc. 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona, N.A. and 
Security Title Company of Salt Lake 
2651 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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postage prepaid, this ft day o 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN of 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Otto Buehner & Company 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a ) ORDER, JUDGMENT AND 
Utah general partnership ) DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
GARY WORTHINGTON and ) 
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general ) 
partners, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
an Arizona corporation, ) 
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona ) 
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE ) 
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A., ) 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF ) 
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A ) 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an ) 
Arizona corporation, ) 
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER & ) 
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY, ) 
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba ) 
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY, ) 
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING, ) Civil No. 83387 
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and ) 
JOHN DOES 1 through 24, ) 
Defendants. 
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The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the judges of the 
above entitled court, on December 3,4,5 and 6, 1984. Robert F. 
Babcock appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs, Worthington 
and Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership, 
Gary Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners; Robert 
F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong appearing for and on behalf of 
C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, comprised of Frank 
S. Campbell, F. Richard Campbell, Robert A. Campbell, Gary Dee 
Jones, Robert F. Bentley, and C & A Companies, Inc., an Arizona 
corporation; LaVar E. Stark appearing for and on behalf of First 
Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., and Stewart Title Company of 
Salt Lake City; Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf of 
Otto Buehner & Company and Joseph Smith Plumbing. Whereupon the 
court heard the respective testimony of plaintiff and defendants 
in support of their Complaint and Counterclaims and Cross-claims 
for a period of four days and then having taken the matter under 
advisement, and being fully advised in the premises, and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. That Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, a 
Utah general partnership, have and recover from C & A Development 
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Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona 
partnership, the sum of $377,131.00 together with interest at the 
rate of 101 and the court further finds that of this amount, 
$2,355.00 was personal property and was not properly lienable, 
leaving a balance due and owing, subject to the Utah Mechanic's 
Lien Statute of $374,776.00. That the amounts as provided herein 
also include the amounts due and owing to Otto Buehner & Company 
as hereinafter set forth, exclusive of attorney fees as provided 
in paragraph 3 of this Decree. 
2. The mechanic's lien filed in Weber County by Gary 
J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball 
Construction Company, to secure the above amounts recorded on 
January 14, 1982, as Entry No. 850356 in Book 1396 at page 258 of 
the official records, as more particularly described in Weber 
County, State of Utah, as: 
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial 
Park 
is null and void and was not properly perfected because of the 
defective verification of the lien pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended. 
3. A notice of lien was filed in Weber County by Gary 
J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball 
Construction Co. secured by the above amounts, recorded February 
8, 1982, as Entry No. 851656 in Book 1397 at page 768 of official 
records, as more particularly described in Weber County, State of 
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Utah, as: 
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial 
Park 
is null and void and was not properly perfected because the 
defective verification of the mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended. 
3. That the amount due and owing to Otto Buehner & 
Company by Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, is the sum 
of $41,466.00 "together with interest since December 1, 1981, in 
the sum of $13,820,00, or a total of $55,286.00, together with 
reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of $12,000.00 or a total of 
$67,286.00 for enforcement of its lien, which is secured by a 
good and sufficient Mechanic's Lien as provided for in Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, on the following described property: 
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial 
Park 
That the mechanic's lien of Otto Buehner & Company is prior in 
time and prior in priority to the interest of any of the other 
defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank 
of Arizona, N.A. , Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, 
Permaloy Corporation, Holbrook Company, Inc., Donald K. Lybbert 
dba Lybbert: Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing 
Company, Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, Gary 
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, and that the above described 
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property be foreclosed and sold by the Sheriff of Weber County, 
as in such cases made and provided and that the proceeds from the 
sale thereof after payment of the costs be applied first to the 
satisfaction of the amounts due and owing to Otto Buehner & 
Company as herein, and the balance, if any, to C & A Development 
Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona 
partnership, and as to any other parties as their interest may 
appear or as the above entitled court may determine. In the 
event that the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy 
the amounts due and owing to defendant, Otto Buehner & Company 
herein, Otto Buehner & Company shall have a deficiency judgment 
against Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, Gary 
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners, 
4. That C & A Development Company, an Arizona 
corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, are 
entitled to a reduction against the amounts owing to Worthington 
& Kimball Construction Company for $6,000.00 as the reasonable 
attorney's fees for prevailing in the mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action and the failure of Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company to establish their mechanic's lien. The same is offset 
against the amounts due and owing as set forth in paragraph 1 of 
the general judgment entered by Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company against C & A Development, an Arizona 
corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership. 
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5. That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. have 
and recover against Worthington & Kimball Construction Company a 
judgment for $6,000.00 as the reasonable attorney's fee for 
prevailing in the mechanic's lien foreclosure action and the 
failure of Worthington & Kimball Construction Company to 
establish their mechanic's lien. 
6. That Otto Buehner & Company have and recover a 
judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction Company for 
the sum of $3,749.94 together with interest at the rate of 15% 
per annum from date hereof, as an additional sum not set forth in 
the foreclosure of its Mechanic's Lien. 
7. That Joseph Smith dba Joseph Smith Plumbing have 
and recover judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary Worthington and Edwin 
N. Kimball, general partners, for the sum of $8,145.04, together 
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date hereof. 
8. Any person acquiring any interest since filing the 
lien as herein specified shall be foreclosed of any right, title 
or interest as subscribed herein. 
9. That the rights and claims of the defendants, 
C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona, N.A., Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, Permaloy 
Corporation, Holbrook Company, Inc., Donald K. Lybbert dba 
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Lybbert Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing 
Company, and Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and any 
other person or persons claiming by or through or under them be 
declared to be subject to and subordinate to the mechanic's lien 
of the defendant, Otto Buehner & Company and such rights or 
claims of such defendants and such other persons be forever 
barred, subject only to redemption in the manner provided by law. 
10. That the plaintiff, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company, a general partnership, have the right to 
commence an appropriate action against the individual partners of 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership for a determination as 
to their liability under this Judgment, without any prejudice for 
failure to join the individual partners at the commencement of 
this action. 
Dated this /5" day of ^ j / W , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
_j/ 
JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify tliat 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Fobert F. Bentley 
Attorney for C & A Development Co, and 
C & A Enterprises, Inc. 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona, N.A. and 
Security Title Company of Salt Lake 
2651 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, th i s Jl day o f ^ X M > u / 1 9 8 5 . 
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III THE SECOIJD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR '7EBER COUNTY 
iJORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a U t a h g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p , 
GARY WORTIIINGTON a n d EDWIN N. KIMBALL, 
g e n e r a l p a r - c r i e r s , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES, 
etal, 
Defendants. 
Cass No. 833G7 
PROCEEDINGS 
trial ; 
RONALD 
in Oad. 
BE IT REIIEI13ERED, that this cause cans on fcr 
;n Decbnbsr 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1934, before the HON. 
0, HYDE, Judge presiding, at t.ie Municipal Building 
=n, Utah. 
APPEARANCES; 
ROBERT F. BABCOCIC, ESQ., appeared fcr plaintiff$. 
ROBERT F. BENTLEY, ESQ., appeared for C & A 
Development and C & A Enterprises? defendant^. 
LaVAR E. STARK, ESQ., appeared for First 
Interstate Bank of Arizona, defendant. 
THOI1A5 A« DUFFIN, ESQ., appeared for Otto 
Buohner & Company9 defendant. 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
437 M U N I C I P A L B L D G . 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
OH DIRECT EXAMINATION 3Y MR. BABCOCK OT MR. KIMBALL: 
Q. Did you have occasion to file a lien en this 
project, a Mecanic's Lien? 
L. Yes, I did. 
0. Let ne direct your attention to Exhibit— r?ell, 
first of £.11, 217. Do you recognize that document? 
1. Yes. This is a lien of a concrete contractor who 
felt tnat he wasn't gating paid wnat was entitled hin for hi: 
work. Ue later, whan he was calmed down, were able to sit 
down and show him that he had been paid every nickel cw=d hinJ 
and he removed this lien. In the meantime I had to insure 
around this one by putting $10,396,00 on deposit with the 
title company that was insuring the title for C & A. 
Q. All right. And this lien, this notice of lien, was| 
in your file? 
A. Yes, I had copies of this lien. 
Q. All right. Let r.e direct your attention to 
Exhibit 218. Do you recognize that exhibit? 
L Okay. I have that in front of ne. 
0. All right. Do you know './hat that document is? 
/<, This is a rough draft that was put together by 
Gary Wcrtningtcn with scne inputs from me. It was determined 
that Wo would utilize as a pattern this lien of Mr. I'uni' s , 
since we weren't lien experts and that was filed by a lawyer, 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
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and t h a t u t i l i z i n g t h a t p a t t e r n v:= would p u t t c - r a t h e r a l i s n 
c r t h= b u i l d i n g . And Mr. ' / c r t n i n a t c n had i t t y p e d up and 
u rucd i t c v = r t e :•'.= t c f i l = . 
0- Ohsy. I n e t s a t t h e t c p c f t h e s s c e n e ne^_ i t 
l lechs l i k s y e u r h a n d w r i t i n g ' s t h e r e and i t c h a n c e d t h s d a t e s . 
Can yeu t e l l us s b c u t t n a t ? 
A. T . r s l l , I had i n ny p e s s e s s i e n a t t h s t i r e a ccpy ef 
t a s dccur ien t t n a t I p i c k e d up f r c n r e n t i n g t h s bach h c e , and 
u t i l i z i n g t n a t dccura=nt I c e u l d e s t a b l i s h t h a t I was en t h s 
j e b en e n s 1 2 t u e f S = p t e r ± - e r — I ' n s c r r y — t h s 1 2 t h ^ 'Ucv i rL i r , 
.. J C . . . Ilr. Williams gave it 
Ju I :.icdified it and retyped it, yes, 
J. I7nat did y:u do witn it after yen had it tyoed° 
I guess I direct your attention tc Exhibit 219. 
Is that "in-a. document that was finalized? 
A. Exhibit 219 is a ccpy cf the document that was 
finalized, yes. 
2. Afwcr you typed it, what did ycu do with it? 
?:. After I typed tha lian# I want cv-r—wall, I naedad 
it notarized, and I thought that probably they'd have a 
(notary up here since they run so rauch work through tha 
recorder• And I went over and notified Nick over at Buahnar 
[Concrete tnat wa had a prcblen and were getting ncwhera, and 
chat I was filing a lien. And I snowed hin this lien that I 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
437 MUNICIPAL BLOG. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
was filing, and informed .*:r.—Gas, I have forgotten his last 
'nana. Dut I infcrnad Hick that he ought tc be filing ens else 
s will as I notified all of v.\y subs that we still hadn't 
b==ri paid rcniss for. And v;han I nanticned tc hin that I 
was headed next tc gat it notarized and filed, Hick tcld n=, 
ne said, "r/a've get a notary right here." And I had forgotten 
wner= I had filed the thing—or where I had nad it netc.rized, 
and so on, until I got to looking into it again. And 'Ir. 
Allrsd is a notary in the office of Buehner Concrete. 
Mow I went out to one car and brought ny briefcase back 
in waile Hick was getting ahold of Mr. Allred, and I brought 
out this decunent showing hin when I had rented the back \\z^ 
and dons that last work, and that since this was the first 
lien I'd ever filed, and net knowing what notaries did with 
liens, I was appalled whan I heard hin say, '"/Jail, I've T:~ 
no interest in that docunant." Ha said, ":iy only purpose is 
to swaar ycu in and have you subscribe to the fact that you 
know the contents of this lien, and that you know that those 
contents are true, and that ycu can testify to that." And 
with tnat explanation I put ny papers back in my briefcase. 
0. Did you sign the lien? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you tell hin that the things were true? 
ft. Yes, I did. 
0. Did he notarize it? 
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A. Yes, ha did. 
Q. v7hat did ycu dc after that? 
A. 17=11, I bswilderuly drcva up hers end filad it. 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
This is -co certify -chat I, Evelyn S, Funk, wa.s cn= of 
the official court reporters of tha Second .Judicial District 
Court of Utah; that I v/as present in court during the trial 
in the above matter, and thereat reported in stenograph tha 
proceedings had. 
The foregoing pagas of transcript, 2 to 5, inclusive f 
constitute a true and correct transcription of my said 
stenographic notes of these portions requested by counsel, 
Dated and signed this c$£~?=- day of October, 
1935. 
Official Court Reporter 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR NEBER COUNTY 
.•70RTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a U - a n cr=.n=ral p a r t n e r s h i p , 
GARY WORTIIINGTON~and EDr.7IN N, KIMBALL, 
g e n e r a l p a r ' c n i r s , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises 
an 
Case No. 83387 
Partial Transcript 
an Arizona partnership, etai, ^•P n roceedir/rs 
•crial • 
0. HYD 
U-5.il. 
Defendants. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that this cause care on for 
:n Decenber 4,5, and 6, 1934, before the "ION. RONALD 
Z, Judge presiding, at 'die Municipal Building in Ogden, 
APPEARANCES ; 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK, ESQ., appeared cor 
Plaintiffs. 
ROBERT F. BENTLEY,ESQ., appeared "or C £. A 
Developneno c.nd C & A Enterprises. 
LaVAR E. STARK, ESQ., appeared for First 
Interstate Bank cf Arizona. 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN, ESQ., appeared on behalf 
of Otto Buehner & Company. 
ru CTORR<; r.S.R. 
(OM CROSS EXAI1INATION, DECEMBER 5, 1984, BY :TR. STARK OF 
ED/7IIJ KIIIBALL) 
BY :iR. STARK: 
Q. Ycur deposition was taken, at least the 14th and 
2 0th day of August of '84, and possibly a day earlier, or a 
f=w days earlier --nan that; is that your recollection? 
A. 5onetime back through that period. I would have 
00 check my calendar, 
Q. Referring 00 Pag= 29-- Is his deposition handy so 
.iB can look at it? 
L. Bob, I believe it's in ny briefcase back there. 
(nanaed to witness) 
Q. Page 29. Let ns ask you if indeed I asked you the 
questions as indicated and the responses as indicated? 
were your responses referring to the Mechanic's Lien that 
you prepared, going to Line 13: 
"0. Let r.e show you what appears to be a copy of 
notice of li^n dated January 13, 1932, apparently signed by 
you, and ask ycu if you recognize it, please? Does that 
appear to be ycur signature? 
Yes, it does. 
Die ycu cause the document tc be prepared? 
Excuse rae? 
Did ycu cause what document tc be prepared? 
Oh, I chink a lack of payment caused it tc be 
II n 
"A. 
"Q. 
It ? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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1 prepared. 
2 "0. Did ycu require scrvacne to type that notice of lien 
3 up? 
4 "A. I typed up. I dcn't do toe well with one fingsr 
5 J missing, but I typed it. 
e Jj "& And ycu typed it uo on cr about the 13th of 
January of '32, the date it shews that it was signed? 
"A. No, we had several rough drafts prior to that, and 
it nay have been typed a day or so before. 
"0. //hen ycu say we raay have had several drafts, to 
when do ycu refer? 
"A. Oh, I reviewed the problem with Itr. T7orthington and 
determined that the tine was of the essence and we .iad to 
"£>. 3c the two of you together talked about making—? 
"A. It seeras like two weeks before cr three weeks befcr-
we nade a rcugh draft of it. 
"Q. The two of you together did? 
19 || "A. Oh, I dcn't recall if it was just ns alone cr the 
20 i "iwo °f u s together, 
2X I  "& Ycu talked with Mr. Worthingtcn? 
22 "A. V7e talked it over, yes. 
23 "Q. And where were ycu v/hen ycu signed this document? 
24 "A. I was in the presence of a notary public. 
25 " Q. Who? 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
1\\ »a. Since I don't use anyone in particular, I nay have 
2 || gone to a used car agency or gone to one of the ether people 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
I knew uha-c had a notary stamp, X- lcoks like Mr. Arnold 
Allan* I do ncc have a personal working acquaintance with 
him, so I ei'cher dropped by the bank or a car dealer, or 
someone that I knew could notarize the document for me. 
7 "0- Dc you recall where ycu v/ere when you signed the 
document? 
"A. Tha-c one may have been done in the bank, I'd have 
10 ^ check en that:. 
11 I "& Is ir your testimony then that you signed this in 
12 tne presence of Arnold Allen? 
13 "A. That's correct. 
14 "Q, On the 13th of January, 1982? 
15 nL I believe that's whan it's dated, yes. 
16 "2. And that was as you recall in a bank? 
17 ,WA. 17ell, like I say, I don't knew. It may have been inj 
18 c^ive bank. It was more than— A-c that cime I was more 
19 inclined to go to one or two cf the branches that were in 
20 itiy area cut there* 
21 f,'Q. What: bank do you refer oc? 
22 "A# " >T^ 3 one thao I do most of my notarizing was First 
23 Security Bank. However, this could have been Tracy Bank & 
24 Trust or Draper Bank. 
25 "& Do you know Arnold Allen? 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
1 "A. I have no working acquaintance with hin. The only 
2 thing I renenber about tha signing cf it is that he wanted 
3 to sea ny driver's license, and see the picture en it, and 
4 ccnpara ir with ne tc naka sure I was zhe one siqning the 
5 J decunenc. 
6 I  "Q Okay. Lock ar that again if ycu would, please. 
7 I  There's sone writing beneath your signature. :7hc typed tha*: 
8 ii i n ? 
g I  "A. Beneath ny signature? 
10 
11 
"Q Yes. 
"J*. I icypad tiia": in. 
12 || "Q. New where were ycu whan ycu typed up tha notice cf 
13 II lien? 
14 || "Ji. In ny residence. 
MQ Urah County? 
"ft. Sandy, 13-eh. 
17 || "0. Ycu dcnft recall what bank ycu went tc, huh? 
"A.. No, I don't. All I knew, it would probably be one 
in icha Sandy area* 
"0 Near where your office is? 
"A. Near where ny hone is. 
22 || "0< Did the notary ask you whether or net the natters 
23 l  s'ca-ced in the notice of the lien were true? 
24 || "A. The notary inforned ne that his seal was for tha 
25 I  sole purpose cf identifying ne and ny oath, and that I had 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
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w£.k=n i t and s igned p r o p e r l y , p r o p a r l y s igned t h e 
document. He s a i d thaw he h i n s e l f by n u t t i n g h i s s e a l en 
t h e r e only s t i p u l a t e d cha t and no th ing r .ore . 
"Q. S ^ p u l a t e d what? 
"A. Tha-c I appeared before h i n , and under oa th I had 
s igned t h e docunent , and th&z i t was t r u e and c o r r e c t , and 
•zhcz I had p e r s o n a l knowledge of i t s c o n t e n t s . " 
Q. Uere t h o s e t h e q u e s t i o n s and ansi /ers a*c t h a t tiir.e? 
i\. Yes, uhay were. 
: «7> p n r n v , all v-Vir-
(ON REDIRECT SEMINATION, DECEIIBER 5, 1934, BY MR. -
BABCOCK OF EDV7III KIMBALL) 
Q. Can ycu explain hew your recollection was 
refreshed about the events following the notarization of 
the Mechanic's Lien that was filed by ycu in this case? 
A. Yes. Mr.. Soark questioned me expensively en v/hsr= 
I had found a notary. I -cold hin what r.y connon practices 
were. Ana wanting -co know for ny3elf where I had signed 
it, so that I would knew for sura what the answers should 
nave been, I gave— Tna-c's why the answers were so vague is 
I did not have to-cal recollection, I went and locked up 
this gentleman's name in -cue phone beck, 
Q. Th== lien had an address under his signature? 
I direct your attention to the exhibit. 
il a FVPLYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
1 A. I don't recall chat. I do know it was locked up 
2 in 'ch= phone book* A call was made to his home. His wife 
3 answered, 
4 I asked: "Is this wh=re the notary public lives, and 
5| where does he work?" 
6 I The response was: "3uehnsr Concrete," 
7 And caen it cane ic light that I had been down there and 
8- seen Hick who had been pressuring ma for payment, and said: 
9 1 "Nick, I'm having to file a lien. If you want tc join in 
10 this, I suggest you get your lien in," 
11 MR. BABCOCX: All right. Thank ycu. 
12 (ON EECRGSS EXAIilNATIQIJ, DECEMBER 5, 1984, BY MR. STARK 
13 I OF EDWIil KIMBALL) 
14 J Q, New I believe you have testified that in the 
15 conduce cf your construction business you hava nor found it 
16 necessary to file any notice of liens; is that correct? 
17 ft. That is correct. Tnis is the first one I've ever 
18 filed. 
19 Q. The first one ycu hava ever filed. 
20 I A- YfeS-
2i 0. And it was filed by you in January of 1982; is thai 
22 right? 
23 A. I'd have to look a- the lien. I assume you're 
24 right. 
25 0. And you were c la iming some $500,000, $400,000, 
EVELYN STORRs, C S . R . 
1 something like that, whatever it says, a large anount of 
2 money? 
3 A. Okay, 
4 J & Right? 
5 1 A- (nods head up and down) 
6 I & So this v/as indeed as far as you'rs concerned an 
7 isolated event in connection with your construction business? 
8i That is to say, it is the first lien you've ever filed? 
i 
9 I A. That I have, yes. 
10 Q Yes. And when your deposition v/as taken in Auaust 
11 of this year, didn't you remember the circumstances of 
12 ! signing that lien and the filing of it? 
13 I A. I didn't renumber the location where I had signed 
14 tne lien. I remembered the circumstances because it was 
15 the first one that I had ever signed. I do remember that 
16 I took paper work with me to show the notary that I could 
17 prove the last date, and so on. And he told me that wasn't 
18 I of his concern. 
19 Q. Well, were the circumstances as you testified in 
20 *che deposition that I read, that was taken in August, or as 
21 Y c u have now testified in court? 
22 A. I don't find any contradiction in either, because 
23 normally I go just down to the bank, or local corner bank or 
24 something, and grab the nearest used car salesman or 
25 whoever has got a notary seal. 
EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
ijj 0, To file a Mechanic's Lien for $500,000? 
2 || A. A notary is a notary; isn't it? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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This is to certify that I, Evelyn S. Funk, was the 
cfficial court reporter of the Second Judicial District 
Court for the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde; that I was present 
in court during the trial in the above natter, and thereat 
reported in stenograph the testimony and proceedings had 
at said trial. 
The foregoing pages of transcript,-2 to 9, 
inclusive, constitute aifuil, true and correct transcription 
of those portions of the testimony, at trial "regarding the 
preparation of the Mechanic's Lien, the appearance before 
the notary public, and the filing of the lien", as requested 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
I, Carole E. Peterson, Chief Clerk of the Utah State House of 
Representatives do hereby certify the attached text entitled 
"Business, Labor Camnittee Minutes, January 17, 1985, 8:00 a.m" 
Is a verbatim text of said canmittee meeting held on January 
17, 1985. 
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No. 56, is a verbatim text of said debate. 
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CAROLE E. PETERSON 
Chief Clerk 
Enclosures 
Business, Labor 
Committee Minutes 
January 17, 1985 
8:00 a.m. 
Mr. Chairman (Rep. Sykes): The next item on the agenda 
is Simplified Mechanics Lien Notice, House Bill 56, Representative 
Holt. I just saw him walk in. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Good morning. 
Chairman: Good morning. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Basically, all this Bill is is a 
House clearing Bill. The purpose of the Mechanics Lien is to give 
a party notice, a claimant or a materialman or someone who is has 
been shorted someway with regards to supplies, labor, services 
performed. I'm an attorney and... run into a practice an awful 
lot that people of the trade just have difficulty filling out 
Mechanics Liens properly and this is just to assist them. The 
Supreme Court is also addressing the problem. The Supreme Court 
has made several rulings with regards to Mechanics Lien, Notary 
type statements in the 1982 and 1983 and they've made it rather 
technical so that anybody that screws up a little bit with regards 
to the statement although the notice is there for everyone to 
read, just because its a Mechanics Lien will lose his claim. The 
old law basically is to set forth a person had to sign one of 
these things under a subscribed and sworn to but different 
practitioners within the state and out of state, there is a lot of 
different notary statements that float around and usually are 
attached to Mechanics Lien and the Supreme Court has come down and 
has construed this language in the existing statute most narrowly 
and that's the purpose of this is just to simplify and get away 
from technicalities I don't think have any part with our 
procedures and our idea of what mechanics liens are for, and 
that's all this bill addressing. 
Mr. Chairman: What, what difference, would you give us 
an example of before and after, concisely how that would ah...be 
different. 
Rep. Scott K. Holt: ...Urn, as the law requires right 
now, a person would have to sign a mechanics lien with the 
statement subscribed and sworn to by a notary. The notary would 
have to use the oath. Although that's how the law is now; this 
basically would mean that a person would just have to sign it and 
date it, and would not have to obtain a notary or go through a 
notarization type process. There wouldn't have to be a notary 
statement put on. And that's what an awful lot of Court cases 
have swung on is the technicality: is has that notary done his or 
her job correctly? Quite a few mechanics have basically lost 
their lien because of a small technicality. The Supreme Court has 
taken the tack that its exact and very precise like I said all the 
requiring the ifs and tfs be crossed in these notary type 
statements in the mechanics lien and a lot of people just donft 
understand. I mean the mechanics liens sounds simple if you read 
through the law, but when you actually put together the form, it!s 
fairly hard for a lot of people and I'm hired and retained a lot 
of times to have to draw these things up for people• This isn't 
something that you should have to go hire a lawyer for to get the 
exact form. This is something that a materialman ought to be able 
to do on his own to protect his lien and this is why — this is 
the problem we're trying to address in this bill is (cough, cough) 
to make it simple for everybody for have and keep lien rights. 
Mr. Chairman: Now we wouldn't want your business to 
suffer because of this, Representative. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: No, but I see an abuse and a need 
and that's all I'm trying to grasp. 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: Representative Scott W. Holt, my 
only question is, right now with the notary being required, is 
this going to change the recording of the lien in order to make it 
valid? 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: No. 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: So it still will need to be 
recorded. Is the date of the 80 days going back from the date 
that it is filed or is it the date that it's recorded? 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: The 80 days, the way the current 
law is, and this hasn't modified the existing law with regard to 
the time periods. For a General Contractor, he has to file his 
lien 100 days after his last work, labor or services were rendered 
or performed. 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: When you say filed, does that mean 
recorded or just have — . 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Recorded* 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: Alright. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Recorded in the appropriate 
recorder's office. I'm not modifying any of the other language, 
that language existed before. This does not change it. 
Mr. Chairman: Alright so this wouldn't create a 
situation where somebody could go in and say, "Well, gee, you know 
I backdated it to the 15th 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: No. 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: But I did file it on the 30th. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Yeah — when — they go by tne date 
of recordation, of the date and time. 
Rep. H. Craig Moody: So the days still apply to the 
recording? 
Mr. Chairman: Uh, just, just one quick question. You 
mean that you wouldn't have to have an acknowledgement to record 
it either? 
-4-
Rep. Scott W. Holt: No. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: See where a lot of people got in 
trouble with was they — . 
Mr. Chairman: So, so you could — . 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Put down an acknowledgement instead 
of a subscribed and sworn to or they'll come in — uh you'll get a 
corporation and you'll have them basically say, like someone is 
working for Boise Cascade, an agency type of situation from the 
main materialman and he'll put down a different form. A lot of 
states require different types of verifications, different types 
of notary type statements. — And Utah, just says subscribed and 
sworn to and where the materialman or the lien claimants have 
gotten trouble in the past is the best technique for setting aside 
these liens by someone who's trying to beat him out of his money_ 
is he'll come in and argue the technicality that he hasn't 
followed the proper lien form. And the Supreme Court, on several 
appellate cases uh, I think it was _First Security Title v. 
Katmans, I remember, a 1982 case. Basically, they come through 
an6 instead of saying veil the person is substantially coir.plifco, 
which is the way it should be, they're saying,"Well, he didn't 
have the right notary — or — on this thing" and they've thrown 
out his lien. So, they've they've construed this most, most 
narrowly, most technically. And what I'm trying to do is re — uh 
— address that problem and say, "Wait a minute Supreme Court, 
-5-
this is not an area that we need to be hyper-technical on." This 
is an area that people? everybody should be able to come in and 
file a claim that they feel that they've been shorted with 
money. Let's get away from being lawyers, let's get away from 
doing — the purpose is just to give a notice, that's the purpose 
of the act. And we shouldn't have too complicated for people to 
do this and that's all I'm trying to do is simplify it. 
.Mr. Chairman: I notice in — uh — on Page 1, Line 33, 
you also took out the section that said he had to deduct his 
credits. So if he gives an approximate amount, the lien would 
still be valid. 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: That's right. Because its all an 
issue when you enforce these liens, the trial courts are always 
going hear what are credits and what are not credits. Also the^e 
was — uh — I guess there's a — the guy that drew this up for us 
has also done some housekeeping that I didn't request but uh — it 
also been taken out uh — alleging what the terms of the agreement 
was in a mechanics lien. Again, I think that's a question for 
fact that will always come up at any trial. I don't — the 
purpose is to give a notice and the more you put in there, that 
the person has to give for notice, the more chance he's going to 
make an error in it, the more chance that this thing is too 
technical for him and you're going to have to, you know, employ an 
attorney to 
-6-
do something more complicated. There is a greater charrCff that 
he'll lose everything that we require. 
Mr. Chairman: Okay Representative Dixon M. Pitcher and 
Representative Hunter. 
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher: Representative, let me see if I 
understand this correctly. Actually we haven't really changed the 
due process of serving, is that correct? 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: Right. 
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher: And so really we're giving it 
the same force — of — it was before as opposed to Court, but 
actually we've simplifed the whole procedure. As far as the way 
you've set it where — . 
Rep. Scott W. Holt: That's true. That's the intent 
here. 
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher: It seems to me this would be a 
great advantage, like you indicated for someone who didn't want to 
come in and retain an attorney and move away from the concept of 
how much justice [inaudible] this legislation. 
Mr. Chairman: Thank you, Representative ? 
Rep. Hunter: Being an individual who believes 
in simplicity, I'd like to move this bill out favorably. 
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher: I second it. 
Mr. Chairman: Before we take a vote on that, as we 
indicated last time we will talk to the public. Is there an-yone 
•7-
here that would like to make a statement on this bill? State your 
name and position. 
Holland, Neal: Mr. Holland Neal, of the Electrical 
Contractors Assn: And we very much appreciate your representative 
that came here and we urge you to support this bill. 
Mr. Chairman: Okay. Any other discussion to the 
motion? Seeing none, I'll place the vote to the committee. AH 
in favor Of passing this bill out favorably, say Aye. Any 
'opposed? It's unanimous. 
-8-
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House bill No. 56 - Simplified Mechanic's Lien & Notice Scott w. 
Holt; Being inacted by the Legislature by the State of Utah, 
Representative Holt: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Before I 
address this Billf I would like to ask the Chair for a personal 
privilege. We have in the gallery, students from the Joseph Kirk 
Elementary School. The teachers are Lucille Garrit, Audrey 
Frances and Janene Manning, fourth and third grade, and I would 
like to ask the House to recognize them at this time, have them 
stand perhaps. 
Mr. Speaker; Please stand and be recognized. 
Representative Holt: Thank you Mr. Speaker. With regard 
to the House Bill No. 56, the intent of this Bill is basically to 
simplify our existing Mechanic's Liens law. The Supreme Court 
came down in two decisions; one in 1981 and another again in 
1983, which chose to construe our language most narrowly. The 
proposed legislation would make it much simpler for the people to 
file Mechanic's Lien and not have to worry about the 
hypertechnicalities that the Supreme Court has placed upon the 
lien law. Most of the act has not been changed, all we're trying 
to do is do away with the requirement of a verification and that 
they put down exact terms and details with regard to the contract 
date a materialman may have entered and it has no fiscal impact, 
it basically is just to simplify the procedures so that anyone 
can file a Mechanic's Lien and not need to have to obtain the 
services of an attorney or something like that. It's just to 
make it a little simpler and a little easier for people who may 
be affected and want to file a lien. 
Mr. Speaker: Others to the bill. Seeing none, I'll turn it 
back to Representative Holt for summation. 
Representative Holt: Ifd waive it Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Speaker: The voting is now open on House Bill 56. 
Seeing that all have voted. Voting is closed, voting 
is closed on House Bill 56, having received 57 affirmative votes 
and no negative votes, passes this House and will be transmitted 
to the Senate for its action. 
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+ 8394.21 
+ 8413.05 
+ 7666.38 
+ 7349.11 
+ 6973.38 
+ 6732.09 
+ 6637.70 
+ 6543.32 
+ 6524.60 
+ 6595.18 
+ 6666.52 
+ 6738.62 
BALANCE 
DUE 
472,7 3158 
481,430.24 
489,634.61 
497,321.87 
504,678.08 
512,143.10 
520,064.24 
528,081.89 
536,223.15 
544,489.92 
552,884.13 
561,297.18 
568563.56 
576,312.67 
583,286.05 
590,018.14 
596,65554 
603,199.16 
609,723.76 
616,318.93 
622 585.44 
629,7 24.06 
